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This dissertation constitutes two essays discussing the market power and price strategy in 
the dairy industry, which historically played an important role in the U.S. agriculture sector. 
The first essay focuses on a merger case in the dairy industry. On April 1, 2009, Foremost 
Farms USA (referred to as Foremost Farms), a Wisconsin-based dairy producers’ cooperative, sold 
its consumer products division, which included two dairy processing plants, to Dean Foods, and 
these plants produced distinct brands of milk. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) 
expressed concern that this acquisition would have substantial anticompetitive effects in certain 
markets. Consistent with this view, in July 2011, the DOJ issued a final order requesting that Dean 
Foods divest one of the newly acquired plants. This essay empirically examines whether DOJ’s 
concern, as well as its policy action, are supported by the data. The results suggest that, except for 
two package sizes of milk, Dean Foods jointly priced the newly acquired brands of milk along 
with its pre-existing milk brands, and such cooperative price-setting behavior is consistent with an 
anticompetitive effect. However, the magnitudes of the percentage increases in price-cost markups 
due to joint pricing are sufficiently small, suggesting that anticompetitive effects should not be of 
concern. In case of the divestiture period, we find that a subset of the products from the divested 
brand went back to being priced separately from Dean Food’s milk products as required by DOJ’s 
order. However, the magnitudes of the percentage decreases in price-cost markups are sufficiently 
small, suggesting that divestiture effects are negligible. 
Consumers’ perception of the marginal quality difference between organic and 
conventional products allow firms to charge a price premium associated with the perceived quality 
difference, the organic price premium.  The organic price premium is effectively consumers’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) for the organic attribute. The second essay addresses the question of 
  
how the quantity of media coverage on organic dairy issues impacts the organic price premium for 
milk.  We first use a theoretical model to illustrate how media information may influence the 
organic price premium. Our subsequent empirical analysis suggests, on average, consumers are 
willing to pay $1.19/gallon more for the organic attribute of milk, which corresponds to 19.07% 
of the mean price per gallon of organic milk.  Second, we find evidence that the quantity of 
newspaper coverage on organic dairy issues significantly increases WTP for the organic feature of 
milk, but this impact follows an inverted-U curve with a diminishing marginal effect.  
Interestingly, TV and Radio news coverage of similar issues are not found to have a significant 
effect on WTP, which may be partly driven by survey evidence suggesting that consumers’ main 
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Chapter 1- Competitive Conduct and Antitrust Policy Actions in the 




Dean Foods is the nation’s largest fluid milk processor, operating 81 dairy plants in 35 U.S. states 
in 2008. On April 1, 2009, Foremost Farms USA (referred to as Foremost Farms), a Wisconsin-
based dairy producers’ cooperative, sold its consumer products division, which included two dairy 
processing plants to Dean Foods. These two processing plants are located in De Pere, Wisconsin 
and Waukesha, Wisconsin respectively. This acquisition cost of $35 million is a value that is less 
than the federal antitrust notification statute value; therefore, this merger was not reported 
beforehand to the federal antitrust authorities. The Department of Justice (DOJ), the states of 
Wisconsin, Illinois and Michigan, filed a civil antitrust suit on January 22, 2010 against Dean 
Foods in the U.S. District Court for Eastern Wisconsin, with the purpose to disassemble the 
acquisition. Because Dean Foods and Foremost Farms were the first and fourth largest milk 
processors in these areas, the complaint argued that this merger eliminated an aggressive 
competitor (Foremost Farms) of the sale of fluid milk against Dean Foods in northeastern Illinois, 
the Upper Peninsula of Michigan and Wisconsin. The complaint also reported the processed milk 
market share of Dean Foods within the region, approximately 57% prior to the acquisition. DOJ’s 
complaint in this case also pointed out that the acquisition disrupted normal dairy competition, and 
increased the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) by 1,127 points to 3,830. The acquisition 
resulted in an even larger increase in HHI within the relevant geographic area, especially in the 
2 
Upper Peninsula of Michigan, where HHI increased by 2,814 points to 7,510.1 On July 29, 2011, 
the final judgment of this case required Dean Foods to divest Waukesha plant, and also required 
Dean Foods to notify DOJ of any future acquisition of milk processing operation if the value of 
the acquisition was $3 million or greater. 
In the U.S., mergers are typically challenged under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which 
prohibits transactions that may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. The primary 
objective of this paper is to empirically examine whether DOJ’s concern, as well as its policy 
action in the case described above, are supported by the data. To achieve the primary objective, 
we use Information Resources Incorporation (IRI)2 retail scanner data to estimate a structural 
econometric model of fluid milk demand and supply. A random coefficients logit model is used to 
capture the demand for milk. One of the major advantages of this model is that it imposes relatively 
few restrictions on obtaining estimates of own- and cross-price demand elasticities compared to 
the standard logit model. As is well-known in the empirical industrial organization literature, an 
important determinant of the market effects of a merger is the degree to which consumers perceive 
products of the firms that merge as substitutable. Since demand elasticities measure the degree to 
which consumers perceive products as substitutes, and merger effects crucially depend on this 
degree of product substitutability, it is important to use an empirical model that most accurately 
estimate demand elasticities.  
Once demand parameter estimates are obtained, we specify several alternative oligopolistic 
competition supply models based on assumed Nash equilibrium price-setting behavior of firms, 
and several different firm-level joint pricing decisions of milk products. Conditional on the set of 
                                                 
1 The United States. Dept. of Justice. U.S. and Plaintiff v. Dean Foods Co., Jan 22, 2010,  <https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/complaint-
81> 
2 IRI Inc: A Chicago-based consulting firm that collects retail scanner data from major U.S. cities. We would like to thank IRI for making the 
data available. All estimates and analysis in this paper, based on data provided by IRI are by the authors and not by IRI. 
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demand parameter estimates, each alternate supply model corresponds to a distinct set of product-
level price-cost margin estimates. The price-cost margin estimates are used to recover associated 
marginal cost estimates, and each set of marginal cost estimates are then regressed on the same set 
of exogenous cost-shifting variables to effectively produce several alternate supply model 
regression equations. Non-nested statistical test developed by Vuong (1989) is applied to assess 
which among the alternate supply models better approximate price-setting behavior during merger 
and divestiture periods, respectively. We refer to merger periods as the time periods in our data 
over which Dean Foods owned the two dairy processing plants acquired from Foremost Farms, 
while divestiture periods are the time periods subsequent to Dean Foods’ divestiture of the 
Waukesha plant. 
In the five IRI markets that might be affected by Dean Food’s acquisition of the two dairy 
processing plants owned by Foremost Farms, we analyze four common package sizes of milk (16 
ounces, 32 ounces, 0.5 gallon, and 1 gallon). Results of non-nested statistical tests of pairwise 
comparisons of the alternate supply models for milk products suggest that for two milk product 
package sizes, 16 ounces and 0.5 gallon, during the merger period Dean Foods jointly priced the 
new brands of milk products that it acquired from Foremost Farms with its pre-existing brands of 
milk products. The number of product observations in these two package sizes account for 70.5% 
of the total number of product observations in the dataset. Therefore, among a vast majority of 
product observations in the dataset, we find evidence of cooperative price-setting behavior across 
Dean Food’s newly acquired and pre-existing brands of milk products, an empirical finding that is 
consistent with the presence of an anticompetitive effect associated with Dean Food’s acquisition 
of the two dairy processing plants owned by Foremost Farms. In light of evidence supportive of 
the existence of an anticompetitive effect, we then use the supply models to compute the 
4 
percentage decreases in product price-cost markups if the relevant brands of milk products were 
non-cooperatively priced instead of being cooperatively priced. The magnitudes of the percentage 
decreases in price-cost markups are typically small, suggesting that the anticompetitive effects are 
not sufficiently large to be of concern.  
In the examined divestiture period, results of non-nested statistical tests of pairwise 
comparisons of the alternate supply models for milk products suggest that, consistent with the 
objective of DOJ’s divestiture policy decision, a subset of the milk products that belong to the 
divested brand are priced separately from the brands of milk products owned by Dean Foods, a 
finding consistent with objective of the divestiture policy decision. However, under the 
counterfactual scenario in which the divested milk products are cooperatively priced with milk 
products owned by Dean Foods, we find that price-cost markups of milk products owned by Dean 
Foods will only increase by small amounts. Furthermore, predicted changes in price-cost markups 
for the divested products may either increase or decrease, but the absolute magnitudes of predicted 
markup changes on these products are also relatively small. As such, the predicted changes in 
price-cost markups are sufficiently small, suggesting that divestiture effects are negligible.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly discusses relevant 
literature. Section 1.3 describes the fluid milk market and presents the available data in the five 
IRI markets that are possibly influenced by the acquisition. Section 1.4 outlines the empirical 
models on the demand side and supply side respectively. Section 1.5 presents and discusses the 
empirical results and Section 6 concludes with a brief summary of the findings. 
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1.2 Relevant Literature  
An important determinant of the market effects of a merger is the degree to which consumers 
perceive products of the firms that merge as substitutable. As such, estimation of demand plays an 
important role in market power analysis. Relatively recent developments in using empirical 
discrete choice models to capture consumer demand for differentiated substitute products, 
especially variants of the logit model [e.g. see Berry (1994); and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 
(1995)], have substantially contributed to structural econometric analyses of market power, actual 
and proposed mergers [Nevo (2000, 2001)]. For example, Nevo (2000, 2001) estimates a random 
coefficients logit demand model of differentiated products to study the merger effects in the U.S. 
ready-to-eat cereal industry. Pinkse and Slade (2002) estimate the brand-level demand of beers 
from panel data, and then use the structural model to assess the effects of mergers on brand 
competition and pricing in the UK brewing industry. Raphael Thomadsen (2005) estimates a 
structural demand and supply model that accounts for market geography, and uses the estimated 
model to perform counterfactual experiments to analyze how ownership structures affect prices. 
Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) estimate a nested logit demand model of the European heavy truck 
market, and use the estimated demand parameters to compare several alternative market power 
tests in light of the Volvo/Scania merger. In line with the methodological framework of this 
literature, we also estimate the demand for differentiated products in the US dairy industry based 
on a random coefficients logit model, then use the estimated demand parameters in an analysis of 
price-setting behavior of US dairy firms in light of merger and divestiture events among a subset 
of the firms.  
The supply side of our analysis also considers modeling vertical relationships between milk 
manufacturers and retailers, which positions our paper in a literature that studies price-setting 
6 
behavior between firms that are vertically related. Cotterill and Dhar (2003) study the pricing 
strategies of vertically related firms, retailers and milk processors, in the Boston fluid milk market. 
The authors specify two game theoretic models, a model of coordination and a model of non-
cooperative Nash behavior among vertically related firms, to capture the strategic interactions 
between retailers and milk processors. In case of the vertical coordination model, each retailer 
maximizes profits as if it owned and controlled milk processors, but in the vertical Nash model, 
processors and retailers non-cooperatively choose wholesale and retail prices to maximize their 
individual profits. Similar to the methodology in our paper, Villas-Boas (2007) analyzes several 
alternate oligopoly supply models distinguished by assumed vertical price-setting behavior 
between yogurt manufactures and yogurt retailers, and uses non-nested statistical tests to determine 
the best-fitting model among the different supply models.3 Bonnet and Bouamra-Mechemache 
(2016) consider a model based on vertical linear contracting between milk processors and retailers 
in the French fluid milk market, and use this model to estimate how the value added created by an 
organic label is shared in a vertical chain among milk processors and retailers. 
 
1.3 The Fluid Milk Industry and Data used in the Analysis 
The fluid milk industry is characterized by increasing consolidation and concentration, which are 
likely driven by economies of size, technological change in manufacturing processes and plants, 
and the high concentration of retail chains. While these structural changes can lead to lower prices 
due to cost reduction from production efficiency, they can also lead to higher prices due to 
                                                 
3 Also see Bonnet and Dubios (2010), Bonnet, Dubios and Villas-Boas (2013), Rey and Verge (2008) for a similar 
research methodology. 
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increases in market power.4 As presented in Table 1.1, in 2008 the number of plants operated by 
the top 10 largest dairy processor and manufacturers ranges from 9 to 81 plants.  
Table 1.1: Top Ten American Dairy Processors in 2008 




1 Dean Foods Co. 12,454 81 
2 Kraft Foods North America Inc. 4,800 16 
3 Saputo Inc. 4,390 45 
4 Land O’ Lake Inc. 4,136 9 
5 Schreiber Food Inc. 3,500 18 
6 Prairie Farms Dairy  2,924 20 
7 Agropur Cooperative 2,800 26 
8 Kroger Co. Dairy Operation 2,500 19 
9 Leprino Food Co. 2,500 9 
10 Darigold Inc. 2,200 11 
Source: Dairy Foods, https://www.dairyfoods.com/ext/resources/DF/Home/Files/PDFs/archives/d/df0809Dairy-100-
table.pdf 
 
Based on the U.S. Census Bureau data summarized in Figure 1, the number of companies 
in the fluid milk processing has declined substantially since 1992, and this decline is accompanied 
by a striking increase in concentration among fluid milk processing firms. Using the largest four 
milk processing firms’ share of shipments in the fluid milk industry to construct a time series of 
four-firm concentration ratios, beginning in year 1997 a sharp increase in the four-firm 
concentration ratio is evident from Figure 1.  The sharp increase in the four-firm concentration 
ratio is largely driven by notable mergers and acquisitions involving Dean Foods. For example, on 
Dec 21, 2001, Dean Foods and Suiza Foods (the top two dairy processors) completed their merger. 
Subsequently, Land O’ Lakes dairy cooperative sold its fluid milk plants to Dean Foods in July 
2002. In 2004 Dean Foods acquires Horizon Organic Holding Corporation, and in April 2009 
Foremost Farms USA sold two milk plants to Dean Foods.  
                                                 
4 GAO-05-50: Information on Milk Prices, Factors Affecting Prices, and Dairy Policy Options 
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Figure 1.1: Fluid Milk Processors 
 
 
Source: Number of companies and the market share data are obtained from U.S. Census Bureau (1992-2007) 
 
This study uses Information Resources Inc. (IRI) retail point-of-sale scanner data. 
Information Resources Inc. is a Chicago marketing firm that uses scanning devices to collect point-
of-sale retail data across 50 geographically distinct markets located in metropolitan and rural areas 
of the United States. Dairy is one of the 30 product categories covered by IRI data, and is the 
product category of interest for this research. The point-of-sale data are weekly and compiled 
according to Universal Product Code (UPC) transactions in retail stores. Four common package 
sizes of fluid milk products are included in the analysis: (i) one gallon; (ii) half gallon; (iii) 32 
ounces; and (iv) 16 ounces. Considering the periods surrounding the merger and divestiture events 
stated in the DOJ’s documents, the time period examined in this paper lies from January 2006 to 
December 2012.  
We define a product as the unique combination of non-price characteristics and retail store, 
where the measured non-price characteristics are: brands, type of milk, flavor, fat content, organic 
versus non-organic classification, and package type materials. Milk consumption is measured by 
monthly aggregate quantity of each uniquely defined product purchased in a retail store located in 
one of the IRI markets. For each product, an average price is computed as the average revenue 
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from sales during the relevant month (in dollars per gallon). Summary statistics of these data are 
reported in Table 1.2. 
Electricity is intensively used by dairy processors to drive machines and for cold storage, 
and therefore is a major input in fluid milk production. As such, to capture a measurable 
determinant of production cost, we collected state level industrial electricity price data from the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration. All price data are deflated by the consumer price index 
(index base year Jan 2008 =100).   
Several non-price product characteristic zero-one dummy variables were constructed to 
facilitate the empirical analysis. Table 1.2 reports summary statistics on product characteristic 
variables used in the empirical analysis. One non-price product characteristic considered is milk 
type, which correspond to the following five categories of milk: (i) full lactose; (ii) reduced lactose; 
(iii) full lactose with acidophilus; (iv) soy milk; and (v) almond milk. Lactose is the major 
carbohydrate found naturally in the milk of most animal species. Milk processing firms often make 
the decision to put a subset of their fluid milk through a processing procedure that reduces the 
amount of lactose naturally present in milk in order to obtain reduced lactose milk products. 
Acidophilus milk is regular milk enriched with acidophilus, a strain of healthy bacteria. Although 
acidophilus has been used to treat or prevent a wide range of ailments, including yeast 
infections, diarrhea, irritable bowel syndrome, lactose intolerance, intestinal problems, and urinary 
tract infections, a subset of the health benefit claims of consuming acidophilus have not been 
scientifically proven. Soy milk is a plant-based drink produced by soaking and grinding soybeans, 
boiling the mixture, and filtering out remaining particulates. Similar to soy milk, almond milk is 
a plant-based drink often consumed by those who are lactose-intolerant and others who wish to 
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avoid dairy products. Almond milk is manufactured from the edible and widely cultivated seed of 
the almond tree.  
In the package size of 16 ounces, there is only full lactose milk, while the 32 ounces 
package size has the following three types of milk: (i) full lactose, which comprises 75.93% of the 
fluid milk in this package size; (ii) reduced lactose, which comprises 10.34% of the fluid milk in 
this package size; and (iii) soy milk, which comprises 13.23% of the fluid milk in this package 
size. There are five types of milk in the 0.5 gallon package size, where full lactose milk accounts 
for 46.91%, followed by soy milk (27.68%), reduced lactose milk (17.48%), almond milk (7.05%) 
and full lactose milk with acidophilus (0.88%). The 1 gallon package size has two types of milk: 
full lactose milk accounts for 92.55%, and soy milk 7.45%. 
There are four milk flavor categories in the dataset: (i) regular white; (ii) vanilla; (iii) 
original; and (iv) plain. The 16 ounces package size only has one milk flavor, which is regular 
white milk. Both 32 ounces and 0.5 gallon package sizes have four milk flavor categories, among 
which the flavor of regular white accounts for the largest share, followed by vanilla, original and 
plain. There are three categories of milk flavor in the 1 gallon package size, 92.55% of which is 
the regular white milk flavor, followed by the flavor categories of vanilla (1.28%) and original 
(6.17%).  
We classify the fat content of dairy milk into two categories, whole milk and non-whole 
milk.  In addition, we put plant-based milk products, such as soy milk and almond milk, into the 
fat content category of non-whole milk. Among the 16 ounces package size 40.66% of the fluid 
milk products are whole milk, while among the 32 ounces package size fluid milk products 34.32% 
are whole milk.  Among the 0.5 gallon package size 24.74% of the fluid milk products are whole 
milk, while 44.36% of the fluid milk products are whole milk among the 1 gallon package size.  
11 
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics 
 
Description 
Size 1 (16 ounces container) Size 2 (32 ounces container) Size 3 (0.5 gallon container) 
 
Size 4 (1 gallon container) 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Max Obs Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Max Obs Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Max Obs Mean 
Standard 
deviation     Min Max Obs 
Real Milk Price (dollars per gallon)1 8.7442 1.3784 3.6775 15.6715 21,114 6.8082 1.6500 1.9321 18.4454 29,901 6.5012 1.4850 1.2917 13.2329 158,439 4.0205 1.4562 0.9786 10.3600 45,267 
Mean Personal Income(dollars per year) 36,789 3,543.6 24,806.1 41,743.1 21,114 35,840.59 3,912.5 24,806.1 41,743.1 29,901 36,296.74 3,632.7 24,806.1 41,743.7 158,439 36,042.13 3823.29 24806.1 41743.1 45,267 
IRI Market Population (per year) 6,040,018 3,393,889 96,527 9,108,058 21,114 5,844,167 3,529,616 96,527 9,108,058 29,901 5,595,475 3,479,540 96,527 9,108,058 158,439 5,239,710 3,513,091 96,527 9,108,058 45,267 
Age 50.0524 16.5273 15 95 21,114 47.8215 17.3157 15 95 29,901 44.3298 19.5273 15 95 158,439 45.2451 18.0210 15 95 45,267 
Real Electricity Price (cents per kWh) 6.1135 0.8647 4.2471 7.8745 21,114 6.1566  0.7958 4.2471 7.8745 29,901 6.1729 0.8204 4.2471 7.8745 158,439 6.1889 0.8065 4.2471 7.8745 45,267 
Milk Type Dummy Variables:                         
     Full Lactose Milk 1 0 1 1 21,114 0.7593 0.4275 0 1 29,901 0.4691 0.4990 0 1 158,439 0.9255 0.2626 0 1 45,267 
     Reduced Lactose Milk2 - - - - - 0.1084 0.3108 0 1 29,901 0.1748 0.3798 0 1 158,439 - - - - - 
Full Lactose Milk with  Acidophilus - - - - - - - - - - 0.0088 0.0937 0 1 158,439 - - - - - 
      Soy Milk - - - - - 0.1323 0.3388 0 1 29,901 0.2768 0.4474 0 1 158,439 0.0745 0.2626 0 1 45,267 
      Almond Milk - - - - - - - - - - 0.0705 0.2559 0 1 158,439 - - - - - 
Flavor Type Dummy Variables:                         
      Regular White 0.9339 0.2484 0 1 21,114 0.8634 0.3434 0 1 29,901 0.6271 0.4836 0 1 158,439 0.9255 0.2626 0 1 45,267 
      Vanilla 0.0661 0.2484 0 1 21,114 0.0734 0.2608 0 1 29,901 0.1623 0.3687 0 1 158,439 0.0128 0.1125 0 1 45,267 
      Original - - - - - 0.0628 0.2426 0 1 29,901 0.1214 0.3266 0 1 158,439 0.0617 0.2406 0 1 45,267 
      Plain - - - - - 0.0004 0.0200 0 1 29,901 0.0892 0.2849 0 1 158,439 - - - - - 
Fat Content Dummy (=1 if whole milk) 0.4066 0.4912 0 1 21,114 0.3432 0.4748 0 1 29,901 0.2474 0.4315 0 1 158,439 0.4436 0.4968 0 1 45,267 
Organic milk Dummy (=1 if organic) - - - - - - - - - - 0.2277 0.4193 0 1 158,439 0.2008 0.4006 0 1 45,267 
Package Type Dummy Variables:                         
       Package of Carton 0.0612 0.2397 0 1 21,114 0.4943 0.5000 0 1 29,901 0.7216 0.4482 0 1 158,439 0.0753 0.2639 0 1 45,267 
       Package of Plastic 0.9388 0.2397 0 1 21,114 0.5057 0.5000 0 1 29,901 0.2197 0.4140 0 1 158,439 0.9237 0.2655 0 1 45,267 
       Package of  Glass  - - - - - - - - - - 0.0587 0.2352 0 1 158,439 0.0010 0.0322 0 1 45,267 
1. All price data are deflated by the consumer price index (CPI) (index base period is Jan, 2008 =100). 
2. Reduced lactose milk includes the lactose-free milk
12 
There is no single variable in the IRI dataset that is constructed with the purpose of 
identifying milk products that are organic.  As such, in order to identify organic milk products 
in the data we examine variables with various descriptive information on each product and 
classify the relevant product as organic if: (i) the brand description includes the word “organic”; 
or (ii) the process description includes the phrases, “organic”, “organic homogenized”, 
“organic pasteurized”, “organic ultra-pasteurized”, or “organic pasteurized and homogenized”. 
In addition, there are a few dairy companies that produce organic products, but neither the 
descriptions of their brands nor their process include the term “organic”. For example, Castle 
Rock, Stonyfiled Farm, and Stremick Heritage are firms that focus on organic dairy production, 
therefore, we treat the products from these three firms as organic products. Based on this 
organic classification methodology we then constructed a zero-one dummy variable that takes 
a value of one only when the relevant product is classified as “organic”. Among fluid milk 
products in 0.5 gallon and 1 gallon package sizes, organic fluid milk products comprise 22.8% 
and 20.08%, respectively.  There are no organic fluid milk products among fluid milk products 
in package sizes 16 ounces and 32 ounces.   
Since materials used for making milk containers differ, we create a set of dummy 
variables to capture the range of container materials. In the 16 ounces package size dataset, 
6.12% of the package containers are made from carton, and 93.88% are made from plastic. In 
the 32 ounces package size dataset, 49.43% of the package containers are made from carton, 
and 50.57% use plastic packaging. Among milk products in 0.5 gallon package size, carton 
packaging accounts for 72.16%, followed by plastic packaging (21.97%), and 0.059% glass 
packaging (0.059%). Among milk products in 1 gallon package size, plastic packaging 
accounts for 92.37%, while carton and glass packaging account for only 7.53% and 0.10%, 
respectively.  
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We supplement the IRI scanner data on milk product sales with market-specific 
consumer demographic information, such as income and age. These demographic data are 
drawn from Public Use Microdata Sample database (PUMS).  
 
1.4 The Empirical Models 
1.4.1 Demand for Differentiated Milk Products 
With the data presented in the previous, we use a random coefficients logit model to estimate 
demand (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995, Nevo 2000 and 2001).  Suppose consumer i is 
faced with the decision to either choose between J differentiated milk products sold in market 
t, where the products are indexed by j = 1, 2 …, J, or choose to not purchase any milk product, 
and this option is represented by j = 0. In making this discrete choice decision, we assume the 
consumer chooses the option that yields the highest satisfaction, i.e., in making the decision 
the consumer effectively solves the following utility maximization problem: 
max
𝑗∈{0,1,2,…,𝐽}
{𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑋𝑗𝑡𝛽𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡}               (1.1) 
where 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the conditional indirect utility consumer i obtains from choosing option j in 
market t; 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is a vector that includes observed non-price product characteristics; and 𝛽𝑖 is the 
vector of consumer-specific taste parameters associated with observed product 
characteristics; 𝜌𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟, 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ and 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 represent fixed effect controls for year, month, and 
geographic location of IRI market respectively;  𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the price of product j in market t, and 𝛼𝑖 
represents the individual-specific marginal utility of price; 𝜉𝑗𝑡 represents product 
characteristics that are unobserved by econometricians but observed by consumers; 𝑖𝑗𝑡 
represents the random component of utility that is assumed independent and identically 
distributed across consumers, products and markets.  








) + Γ𝐷𝑖 + Σ𝑣𝑖                                     (1.2) 
where 𝐷𝑖 is an m-dimensional column vector of demographic variables (assuming there are m 
distinct demographic variables), and each demographic variable enters the vector in the form 
of deviation of individual i’s demographic variable from the mean of the market sample of 




)), where the parameters measure how taste characteristics vary with 
demographics; 𝑣𝑖 is a L-dimensional column vector of unobserved shocks to consumer taste 
for respective product characteristics; and Σ is a L-by-L diagonal matrix, where elements on 
the main diagonal are parameters that measure variation in taste due to the random shocks in 
𝑣𝑖.  
In the demand estimation, demographic variables in 𝐷𝑖 are income and age. Since 
demographic variables in 𝐷𝑖 are expressed in deviations from their respective means, the mean 
of each variable in 𝐷𝑖 is zero. Following Nevo (2000), we assume that 𝑣𝑖 has a standard 
multivariate normal distribution, 𝑣𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝐼). Therefore, the previously described properties 






) and the variance is equal to the square of the 
elements on the main diagonal of Σ. 
Substituting equation (1.2) into the indirect utility function shown in equation (1.1) 
allows us to re-write the indirect utility function as follows: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗𝑡(𝑥𝑗𝑡 , 𝑝𝑗𝑡 , 𝜉𝑗𝑡; 𝜃1) + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝑥𝑗𝑡 , 𝑝𝑗𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖, 𝑣𝑖; 𝜃2) + 𝑖𝑗𝑡              (1.3) 
where 𝜃1 = (𝛽, 𝛼, 𝜌𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 , 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ, 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡), 𝜃2 = (Γ, Σ) and  
  𝛿𝑗𝑡 = 𝑋𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡                       (1.4) 
𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 = [𝑥𝑗𝑡 ,   𝑝𝑗𝑡](Γ𝐷𝑖 + Σ𝑣𝑖)      (1.5) 
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Since the mean of  𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 and the mean of 𝑖𝑗𝑡 across consumers both equal to zero, then 
equation (1.3) reveals that the mean of 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 across consumers is 𝛿𝑗𝑡. Therefore, the mean utility 
across consumers who purchase product j is 𝛿𝑗𝑡, while 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 𝑖𝑗𝑡 capture consumer i’s 
deviation from the mean utility. 
As described above, we allow consumers the option not to choose one of the 
differentiated milk products, and this option is represented by j = 0. This option is often referred 
to as the outside good, or outside option. Following much of the literature, we assume that the 
mean utility obtained from choosing the outside good is normalized to be zero and constant 
over time, i.e., the indirect utility from this outside option is 𝑈𝑖0𝑡 = 𝑖0𝑡 = 0. 
Assuming that 𝑖𝑗𝑡 is independent and identically distributed with an extreme value type 
I density, the predicted market share of product j in market t is given by: 





) 𝑑?̂?(𝐷)𝑑Φ(𝑣𝑖)  𝐴𝑗𝑡
  (1.6) 
where 𝐴𝑗𝑡 represents the set of consumers who choose product j in market t, ?̂?(𝐷) is the 
empirical distribution of demographic variables (income, age, etc.) in the market. Φ(∙) is the 
standard normal distribution function.  Since there is no closed-form solution for the integral 
in equation (1.6), this integral must be approximated numerically using random draws from 
?̂?(𝐷) and Φ(∙). We use 300 random draws from ?̂?(∙) and Φ(∙) for the numerical approximation 
of  𝑠𝑗𝑡(∙).  As previously stated, consumer demographic information, such as income and age, 
are randomly drawn from Public Use Microdata Sample database (PUMS). 
Based on the discrete choice model described above, the demand for product j in market 
t is simply given by: 
𝑑𝑗𝑡 = 𝑠𝑗𝑡(𝑥𝑗𝑡 , 𝑝𝑗𝑡, 𝜉𝑗𝑡; Θ) × 𝑀𝑡                 (1.7) 
where Θ = (𝜃1, 𝜃2) is the vector of demand parameters to be estimated, and 𝑀𝑡 is a measure 
of the potential market size of market t.   
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We construct the potential market size measure, 𝑀𝑡, in each market using the following 
procedure.  First, we obtained data on annual per capita dairy fluid milk consumption from 
United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA ERS).5  Since 
USDA ERS per capita dairy fluid milk consumption data are measured in liquid pounds, we 
converted the unit of measurement of these data to gallons, and divide by 12 to obtain average 
monthly per capita consumption of dairy fluid milk in gallons.  Second, even though we were 
not able to obtain per capita consumption of soy milk directly, we sourced data on annual total 
sales of soy milk in gallons,6 and divide these unit sales data by population size to obtain 
average annual per capita soy milk consumption. We then convert these average annual per 
capita soy milk consumption data to average monthly per capita soy milk consumption. This 
method is also used to compute monthly per capita consumption of almond milk.7 Third, 
monthly per capita fluid milk (dairy, soy, and almond) consumption is obtained by summing 
monthly per capita consumption of dairy, soy, and almond milk. Last, potential market size 
measure, 𝑀𝑡, in each market is computed by using the population size of the relevant 
geographic market multiplied by monthly per capita fluid milk consumption. 
Using the random coefficients logit model to estimate the demand not only allows for 
consumer heterogeneity, but also provides a more flexible pattern of consumption substitution 











∫𝛼𝑖 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡(1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡)𝑑?̂?(𝐷)𝜙(𝑣𝑖)𝑑𝑣𝑖      𝑖𝑓 𝑗 = 𝑘
𝑝𝑘𝑡
𝑑𝑗𝑡
∫𝛼𝑖 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑑?̂?(𝐷)𝜙(𝑣𝑖)𝑑𝑣𝑖        𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒






 is the probability of consumer i purchasing product j. Each 
consumer has different price sensitivity, which will be averaged to a mean price sensitivity 
                                                 
5 https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/dairy-data/ 
6 https://www.statista.com/statistics/552967/us-soy-milk-sales/ 
7 The sales data of almond milk is only available from year 2008. As such, we compute the monthly per capita 
consumption of almond milk from 2008 to 2012. 
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using 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 as weights. The cross-price elasticities are driven by product characteristics and 
consumers’ heterogeneity. 
 
1.4.2 Demand Estimation and Instruments 
Parameters of the demand model are estimated using Methods of Simulated Moments 
(MSM) algorithm outlined in Nevo (2000). We construct the MSM estimator by using 
instrumental variables that are orthogonal to product characteristics captured in 𝜉𝑗𝑡. As 
previously stated, product characteristics captured in 𝜉𝑗𝑡 are unobserved to us but observed by 
firms and consumers. Instrumental variables for the product price of milk are needed because 
it is likely that 𝜉𝑗𝑡 is correlated with milk price.  
In the mean utility function (equation (1.4)), 𝜉𝑗𝑡 represents product characteristics such 
as consumer brand loyalty, firm promotional activities, the shelf display of milk products in 
retail stores, etc., which are observed by the firms and consumers but unobserved by the 
econometrician. Therefore, the price of product j in market t (𝑝𝑗𝑡) is correlated with 𝜉𝑗𝑡. The 
variables used to instrument milk price are state-level electricity price for the industrial sector 
interacted with milk brand dummies. It is reasonable to assume that an input price such as 
electricity price is uncorrelated with 𝜉𝑗𝑡, but highly correlated with milk price. For example, 
the consumer brand loyalty is most likely to be uncorrelated with the state-level electricity 
price, but changes in the price of electricity are likely to influence fluid milk prices. In fact, in 
year 2006 the electricity consumption in dairy industry accounted for nearly 13% of the entire 
food industry electricity usage (U.S. DOE 2006b). The monthly state-level electricity price for 
the industrial sector are collected from U.S. Energy Information Administration. We choose 
the monthly state-level industrial electricity price instead of national average electricity price 
because the industrial electricity price vary across states, and such variation potentially helps 
with identification. 
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 The underlying intuition to interact the electricity price with brand dummies is to allow 
this input price to influence the production cost of each brand differently. Electricity price is 
likely to have differential impacts on production costs across milk brands when there is 
variation in the intensities with which the milk brands use electricity. For example, the brand 
“lactaid” focus on reduced lactose dairy milk, which is likely to consume more electricity than 
processing regular full lactose dairy milk. It is also known that the shelf life of organic milk is 
longer than conventional milk because organic milk usually undergoes ultrahigh temperature 
(UHT) processing or treatment, and conventional milk typically requires a standard 
preservation process. UHT requires higher electricity consumption, as such, electricity usage 
required by the production process is different across organic milk brands and conventional 
milk brands. Therefore, the electricity consumption is likely different between organic milk 
brands such as “Horizon organic” and conventional milk brands such as “Deans”.  Yet another 
example in which electricity usage required by the production process likely differ across 
various milk brand products is based on the fat content present in the final milk product. 
 
1.4.3 Alternative Supply Models 
The primary objective of this paper is to empirically examine the importance of DOJ’s 
anticompetitive concern of Dean Foods’ acquisition of two milk-processing plants owned by 
Foremost Farms, as well as DOJ’s final order requiring that Dean Foods divest one of the newly 
acquired plants. The general empirical strategy is to use a non-nested statistical test to compare 
equilibrium price-setting behavior across the alternative supply models to investigate which 
among the supply models better fit the available data during the merger and divestiture periods 
respectively.  
We assume that manufacturers and retailers set their prices sequentially, i.e., 
manufacturers first set the wholesale price 𝑝𝑗
𝑤 in Bertrand Nash fashion, and then retailers 
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follow to set retail price 𝑝𝑗 also in Bertrand Nash fashion. Consistent with using backward 
induction for solving the subgame perfect equilibrium in a sequential strategy choice game, we 
begin by describing the optimizing price-setting behavior of the retailers, then we describe the 
optimal price-setting behavior of the manufacturers.   
Suppose there are R retailers, and retailers are indexed by = 1,2, … , 𝑅 . Let 𝑆𝑟 be the 
subset of the J products that are sold by retailer 𝑟. We assume that each retailer 𝑟 maximizes 
its profit by appropriately setting retail price levels for the set of products that belong to 𝑆𝑟, 





[∑ (𝑝𝑗  − 𝑝𝑗
𝑤 −𝑚𝑐𝑗
𝑟) ∗ 𝑑𝑗(𝑝) − 𝐶𝑟  𝑗∈𝑆𝑟 ]   (1.9) 
where 𝑑𝑗 = 𝑀 ∗ 𝑠𝑗(𝑝, 𝜉, Θ) based on the previously described demand model; 𝑝𝑗
𝑤 is the 
wholesale price that retailer r pays to obtain product j from the manufacturer; 𝑚𝑐𝑗
𝑟 is the 
marginal cost that retailer r incurs in providing product j to consumers; and 𝐶𝑟 is the fixed cost 
of retailing incurred by retailer r. Market subscripts are suppressed in profit functions and the 
subsequent equations only for notional convenience. In an Nash equilibrium, retail price 𝑝𝑗 of 
any product j sold by retailer r must satisfy the following first-order conditions: 





= 0       𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑟   (1.10) 
A couple more definitions will allow us to use matrix notations to express the set of 
first-order conditions that follow from profit maximizing price-setting behavior. First, let 𝑇𝑅 
be a 𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix of appropriately positioned zeros and ones based on the product ownership 
structure across retailers. In particular, let element 𝑇𝑘𝑙
𝑅  in matrix 𝑇𝑅 be defined as follows: 
𝑇𝑘𝑙
𝑅 = {
1,   𝑖𝑓 ∃ 𝑟: {𝑘, 𝑙} ⊂ 𝑆𝑟
0,               𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
that is, the element in row 𝑘 and column 𝑙 of matrix 𝑇𝑅 is equal to one if there exists a retailer  
𝑟 that sells both product 𝑘 and product  𝑙, otherwise element 𝑇𝑘𝑙
𝑅  is equal to zero.  The way in 
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which matrix 𝑇𝑅 is used in subsequent analyses; this matrix effectively determines which sets 
of products retailers jointly price. Second, let ∆𝑅 be a 𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix of first-order derivatives of 
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The set of first-order conditions that follow from profit maximizing price-setting 
behavior of retailers can be written in matrix notation as follows:  
𝑠(𝑝) + (𝑇𝑅 ∗ ∆𝑅) × (𝑝 − 𝑝𝑤 −𝑚𝑐𝑟) = 0        (1.11) 
where (𝑇𝑅 ∗ ∆𝑅) is an element-by-element multiplication of the two matrices; 𝑠(∙), 𝑝, 𝑝𝑤, and 
𝑚𝑐𝑟 are 𝐽 × 1 vectors of predicted product shares, retail prices, wholesale prices, and retailers’ 
marginal costs, respectively.  The first-order condition in equation (1.11) can be re-arranged to 
obtain retailers’ product-level markups as follows: 
𝑝 − 𝑝𝑤 −𝑚𝑐𝑟 = −(𝑇𝑅 ∗ ∆𝑅)−1 × 𝑠(𝑝) = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑅(𝑝, 𝜉; Θ, 𝑇𝑅)  (1.12) 
Note that product-level retail markups are a function of demand-side variables and 
parameter estimates, as well as the product ownership structure matrix across retailers, 𝑇𝑅. As 
such, with demand parameter estimates in hand, Θ̂, and a given structure for matrix 𝑇𝑅, the 
right-hand-side of equation (1.12) allows us to compute product-level retail markups.   
We now describe optimal wholesale price-setting behavior of the manufacturers. 
Suppose there are F manufacturers. Let 𝑓 = 1,2, … , 𝐹 index manufacturers and ℱ𝑓 be the subset 
of the J products that are produced by manufacturer f. We assume that each manufacturer f sets 
wholesale prices for its products at levels that maximizes the manufacturer’s profit, i.e., 











𝑤), 𝜉, Θ) 𝑗∈ℱ𝑓 − 𝐶𝑓]  (1.13) 
where 𝑠𝑗(𝑝(𝑝𝑗
𝑤), 𝜉, Θ) is the market share of product j, which is a function of the retail prices 
of all products, and these retail prices are a function of wholesale prices; 𝑚𝑐𝑗
𝑤 is the marginal 
cost the manufacturer incurs to produce product j; and 𝐶𝑓 is the fixed cost of production. A 
Nash equilibrium wholesale price 𝑝𝑗
𝑤 of any product j produced by firm f must satisfy the first-
order condition:  
𝑠𝑗(𝑝(𝑝𝑗






𝑤 = 0      (1.14) 
First, let 𝑇𝐹 be a 𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix of appropriately positioned zeros and ones that describes 
ownership structure of the 𝐽 products across manufacturers, and let 𝑇𝑘𝑙




1,   𝑖𝑓 ∃ 𝑓: {𝑘, 𝑙} ⊂ ℱ𝑓
0,               𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
that is, the element in row 𝑘 and column 𝑙 of matrix 𝑇𝐹 is equal to one if there exists a 
manufacturer 𝑓 that produces product 𝑘 and product  𝑙, otherwise element 𝑇𝑘𝑙
𝐹  is equal to zero. 
The way in which matrix 𝑇𝐹 is used in subsequent analyses; this matrix effectively determines 
which sets of products manufacturers jointly price. Note that 𝑇𝐹 ≠ 𝑇𝑅 since manufacturers’ 
ownership structure of the products is different from retailers’ ownership structure of the 
products.  
Second, let ∆𝐹 be a 𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix of first-order derivatives of product market shares with 
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The set of first-order conditions that follow from profit maximizing price-setting 
behavior of manufacturers can be written in matrix notation as follows: 
𝑠(𝑝) + (𝑇𝐹 ∗ ∆𝐹) × (𝑝𝑤 −𝑚𝑐𝑤) = 0                           (1.15) 
where (𝑇𝐹 ∗ ∆𝐹) is an element-by-element multiplication of the two matrices; 𝑠(∙), 𝑝𝑤, and 
𝑚𝑐𝑤 are 𝐽 × 1 vectors of predicted product shares, wholesale prices, and manufacturers’ 
marginal costs, respectively. The first-order condition in equation (1.15) can be re-arranged to 
obtain manufacturers’ product-level markups as follows: 
𝑝𝑤 −𝑚𝑐𝑤 = −(𝑇𝐹 ∗ ∆𝐹)−1 × 𝑠(𝑝) = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐹(𝑝, 𝜉; Θ, 𝑇𝐹)  (1.16) 
Note that product-level manufacturer markups are a function of demand-side variables 
and parameter estimates, as well as the product ownership structure matrix across 
manufacturers, 𝑇𝐹. As such, with demand parameter estimates in hand, Θ̂, and a given structure 
for matrix 𝑇𝐹, the right-hand-side of equation (1.16) allows us to compute product-level 
manufacturer markups. 
The total markup on each product can be obtained by summing retailers’ product-level 
markups and manufacturers’ product-level markups. As such, we can obtain the equation for 
total markup on each product by summing equation (1.12) and equation (1.16):   
[𝑝 − 𝑝𝑤 −𝑚𝑐𝑟] + [𝑝𝑤 −𝑚𝑐𝑤] = [−(𝑇𝑅 ∗ ∆𝑅)−1 × 𝑠(𝑝)] + [−(𝑇𝐹 ∗ ∆𝐹)−1 × 𝑠(𝑝)] 
𝑝 −𝑚𝑐 = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑅(𝑝, 𝜉; Θ, 𝑇𝑅) + 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐹(𝑝, 𝜉; Θ, 𝑇𝐹)         (1.17) 
where 𝑚𝑐 is the vector of the sum of marginal cost from both retailers and manufacturers, i.e., 
𝑚𝑐 = 𝑚𝑐𝑟 +𝑚𝑐𝑤                        (1.18) 
To facilitate subsequent econometric estimation of the relevant supply-side equation, it 
is convenient to re-write equation (1.17) as follows:  
𝑝 −𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑅(𝑝, 𝜉; Θ, 𝑇𝑅) − 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐹(𝑝, 𝜉; Θ, 𝑇𝐹) = 𝑚𝑐  (1.19) 
It is possible that competition in the milk industry is better characterize by strategically 
active price-setting milk manufacturers, but strategically passive price-setting milk retailers. In 
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this situation milk retailers simply set prices to cover their effective marginal cost of operating, 
i.e., retailers have zero markups, 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑤 −𝑚𝑐𝑟 = 0 = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑅(𝑝, 𝜉; Θ, 𝑇𝑅). Based on the 
supply-side derivations laid out above, the relevant supply-side equation under active price-
setting manufacturers, but passive retailers is: 
𝑝 −𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐹(𝑝, 𝜉; Θ, 𝑇𝐹) = 𝑚𝑐                (1.20) 
The analysis answers the following two key questions: (i) Whether Dean Food’s 
acquisition of two milk-processing plants and associated brands of milk products owned by 
Foremost Farms resulted in the newly acquired brands of milk products being jointly priced 
with Dean Food’s pre-existing brands of milk products?; and (ii) In accordance with the DOJ’s 
final order of divestiture, whether Dean Food’s divestiture of one milk-processing plant and 
associated brands of milk products resulted in the divested brands of milk products being priced 
separately from the brands of milk products owned by Dean Foods? As stated above, matrix 
𝑇𝐹 in the supply model effectively determines which sets of products manufacturers jointly 
price. As such, we define two versions of matrix 𝑇𝐹 to capture contrasting price-setting 
behavior of Dean Foods: (i) 𝑇𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐹  is used in supply models that assume Dean Foods chooses 
to jointly price the newly acquired brands of milk products with its pre-existing brands of milk 
products, and subsequent to the divestiture, the divested brands of milk products are priced 
separately from the brands of milk products owned by Dean Foods; and (ii) 𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐹  is 
used in supply models that assume Dean Foods chooses to separately price the newly acquired 
brands of milk products from its pre-existing brands of milk products, and subsequent to the 
divestiture, the divested brands of milk products are priced jointly with the brands of milk 
products owned by Dean Foods. These two versions of matrix 𝑇𝐹result in the following four 
distinct supply models:  
Supply Model 1: Active Price-Setting by Manufacturers and Retailers with Price-setting 
behavior of Manufactures Captured by 𝑇𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐹 : 
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𝑝 −𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑅(𝑝, 𝜉; Θ, 𝑇𝑅) − 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐹(𝑝, 𝜉; Θ, 𝑇𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐹 ) = 𝑚𝑐1 
Supply Model 2: Active Price-Setting by Manufacturers and Retailers with Price-setting 
behavior of Manufactures Captured by 𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐹 : 
𝑝 −𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑅(𝑝, 𝜉; Θ, 𝑇𝑅) − 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐹(𝑝, 𝜉; Θ, 𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐹 ) = 𝑚𝑐2 
Supply Model 3: Active Price-setting Manufacturers but Passive Retailers, with Price-
setting behavior of Manufactures Captured by 𝑇𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐹 : 
𝑝 −𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐹(𝑝, 𝜉; Θ, 𝑇𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐹 ) = 𝑚𝑐3 
Supply Model 4: Active Price-setting Manufacturers but Passive Retailers, with Price-
setting behavior of Manufactures Captured by 𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐹 : 
𝑝 − 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐹(𝑝, 𝜉; Θ, 𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐹 ) = 𝑚𝑐4 
To facilitate econometric estimation of the supply models laid out above, we 
parametrize the marginal cost function on the right-hand-side of each equation. As such, we 
now consider marginal cost-shifting variables to facilitate a parametric specification of a 
marginal cost function.  
It is well-known that fluid milk is highly perishable and milk packaging is important to 
effectively guarantee the quality of milk and maintain the nutrition during storage and 
transportation. The type of packaging material used is one of the critical factors to influence 
the production cost of milk products. For example, compared to plastic and carton packaging, 
glass packaging is more costly to manufacture (Karaman, 2015). In our dataset, there are three 
types of packaging materials: glass; plastic; and paperboard carton. Therefore, we use package 
material zero-one dummy variables as one set of marginal cost shifters.  
Fat content is an expensive component of milk and a key factor in determining how 
much dairy farmers are paid for milk (Vaclacik and Christian, 2007). Therefore, we also 
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include a fat content dummy variable in the marginal cost specification. The zero-one fat 
content dummy variable takes a value of one for whole milk products, and zero otherwise.  
Plant-based milk is a popular substitute for dairy milk. Two widely consumed plant-
based milk substitutes are soy milk and almond milk (Yadav et.al, 2017).   Obviously, the 
production process for plant-based milk differs from dairy milk, and therefore it is likely that 
there are differences in production costs across these types of milk. As such, we use as marginal 
cost-shifting variables, zero-one dummy variables that will capture differences in marginal 
costs across plant-based versus dairy milk products.  
Organic milk virtually prohibits the use of antibiotics and hormones in the cow herd 
and the use of synthetic chemicals in the production of cattle feed. Farms with organic milk 
production are also required to accommodate the animals’ natural nutritional and behavioral 
requirements. The tougher standards and additional requirements in organic milk production 
are likely to result in higher production costs compared with conventional milk. On average, 
organic dairies have estimated costs that are approximately $5 to $8 per hundredweight (cwt) 
higher than conventional dairies (McBride and Greene, 2009). As such, we also include a zero-
one organic milk dummy in the marginal cost specification.  
Electricity is viewed as the most important direct input in the dairy industry, which 
motivated us to use the interaction of electricity price with milk brand dummies as instruments 
for retail price of milk in the demand model. The same rationale motivates us to use these 
demand model instruments as marginal cost-shifting variables in the marginal cost 
specification. 
Based on the above information, we assume the following specification for the marginal 
cost function: 
𝑚𝑐 = 𝜆 + 𝜓𝑊 + 𝜅                                     (1.21) 
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where 𝜆 is a vector of the sum of time fixed effects, geographic market fixed effects, and 
product fixed effects;8 𝑊 is the vector of cost shifters including the package material dummies, 
the fat content dummy, the milk type dummies (full lactose milk, reduced lactose milk, full 
lactose milk with acidophilus, soy milk, almond milk), the organic dummy, and electricity price 
interacted with brand dummies; 𝜓 is a vector of parameters associated with marginal cost-
shifting variables in 𝑊; and 𝜅 captures random shocks to marginal cost that are unobserved to 
us the researchers, but observed by firms. Under the assumption that 𝐸(𝜅|𝜆,𝑊) = 0, 𝜆 and 
𝜓 can be estimated consistently. 
 
1.4.4 Non-nested Statistical Test for Supply Model Selection 
As revealed in the discussion above, there are four supply models to statistically 
compare. For notational simplicity, let any two of the supply models being statistically 
compared be denoted by h and ℎ′, where the two supply models are compactly represented by 
the following two equations:    










           (1.23) 
where 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝 is a vector of the sum of retailer and manufacturer markups. In the 
passive retailer supply model, as the retailers’ markup is zero, then the 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝 is the 
manufacturers’ markup. 
Assume that random shocks 𝜅𝑗
ℎ and 𝜅𝑗
ℎ′are normally distributed. We define 𝐿𝐿𝑗
ℎ as the 
optimal value of the log likelihood function for model h evaluated at observation j, and  𝐿𝐿𝑗
ℎ′is 
defined analogously for model ℎ′. Furthermore, let 𝜙(∙) represents the normal probability 
                                                 
8 We define a product by the unique combination of non-price characteristics and retail store. As such, our product fixed effects control for a 
composite of product features that are correlated with marginal cost of a product. 
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density function, and LR represents the likelihood ratio statistic for comparing model h and ℎ′. 
The definitions above result in the following equations: 
𝐿𝐿𝑛
ℎ = log[𝜙(𝑝𝑛 − 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑛
ℎ − 𝜆ℎ − 𝜓ℎ𝑊𝑛)]  (1.24) 
𝐿𝐿𝑛





𝑊𝑛)]   (1.25) 
𝐿𝑅 = ∑ (𝐿𝐿𝑛
ℎ − 𝐿𝐿𝑛
ℎ′)𝑁𝑛=1       (1.26) 
Vuong (1989) shows that the likelihood ratio statistic, 𝐿𝑅, can be normalized by its own 













  𝑁𝑛=1   (1.27) 
Therefore, the non-nested test statistic, 𝑄 = 𝑁0.5
𝐿𝑅
𝑣
, is asymptotically standard normal 
distributed under the null hypothesis that model h and model ℎ′ being compared by the test are 
asymptotically equivalent. Based on a one-tale test at 5% level of statistical significance, the 
selection procedure involves comparing 𝑄 with the critical values, 1.64 and -1.64. 𝑄 > 1.64 
implies that model ℎ′ is statistically rejected in favor of model h. 𝑄 < −1.64 implies that model 
h is statistically rejected in favor of model ℎ′. −1.64 < 𝑄 < 1.64 indicates that model h and 
model ℎ′ cannot be statistically distinguished. 
 
1.5 Econometric Estimation and Inferences 
1.5.1 Demand Estimation 
Parameter estimates for the random coefficients logit model of demand are reported in Table 
1.3. We also estimate the standard logit version of the demand model using Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) and Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimators. Estimation results for the 
standard logit version of the demand model are reported in Table A.1 and Table A.2 located in 
the Appendix. The reader can also find in Table A.2 a Wu-Hausman statistical test to examine 
the endogeneity of the price. The results of this test provide strong evidence that price is indeed 
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endogenous, thus confirming the need for price instruments. Panel A of Table 1.3 reports the 
estimated coefficients in the mean utility function, which are associated with the linear 
parameters in equation (1.4), while Panel B presents parameter estimates that measure 
consumers’ taste heterogeneity, which are the non-linear parameters in equation (1.5).    
We estimated the demand model separately for four different package sizes, which is 
important for allowing consumer preferences and therefore demand parameters to differ across 
package sizes. Consumer preferences may differ across package sizes if firms are able to 
effectively price discriminate and segment consumers based on their differing preferences 
across package sizes. As shown in summary statistics of the data reported above in Table1.2, 
mean prices per gallon of milk products within each of the four package sizes differ across the 
package sizes. In particular, the summary data evidence on prices suggests that mean price per 
gallon of milk is lower among milk products in larger package sizes. Such quantity discounting 
is suggestive of price discriminatory practices designed to segment different consumer groups 
by package sizes [see chapter 6 in Pepall, Richards and Norman (2014)]. Effective 
segmentation of consumer types by package sizes implies that we may observe consumers 
having contrasting preferences for a given product attribute in different package sizes of milk 
products.  
Across the four different package sizes of milk, the price coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant, suggesting that, on average, consumers’ level of utility is inversely 
related to the price of the product.  As such, consistent with expectation, if non-price product 
characteristics across competing products are equal, then our estimated price effect implies that 
consumers will choose the milk product that has the lower price. 
The estimated coefficients on the fat-content dummy variable are positive and 
statistically significant in the package size of 16 ounces and 0.5 gallon, however, they are 
negative and statistically significant in both 32 ounces and 1 gallon package size. Recall that 
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the fat-content dummy variable takes a value of one for whole milk products, and zero 
otherwise. As such, controlling for other product characteristics, the results indicate that 
consuming whole milk in 16 ounces and 0.5 gallon sizes would increase the average 
consumer’s utility, but in 32 ounces and 1 gallon package size consumers prefer non-whole 
milk. These results suggest that consumers who typically purchase milk products in package 
sizes of 16 ounces and 0.5 gallon containers have a different preference for whole milk than 
consumers who typically purchase milk products in package sizes of 32 ounces and 1 gallon. 
The coefficient estimates on the vanilla flavor dummy variable are negative and 
statistically significant in both 16 ounces and 0.5 gallon package sizes, suggesting that 
compared with vanilla flavor, consumers prefer regular white milk. The vanilla flavoring added 
to milk can either be artificial or real, and vanilla extract often contains alcohol. As such, 
perhaps driven by a greater concern for health, the typical consumers of 16 ounces and 0.5 
gallon package sizes of milk products prefer to avoid milk products with added vanilla 
flavoring. However, in the package sizes of 32 ounces and 1 gallon, the coefficient estimates 
on the vanilla flavor dummy variable are positive and statistically significant, indicating that 
in these two package sizes of milk, relative to regular white milk, the vanilla flavor of milk 
generate higher utility for the average consumer.  
There is a greater variety of flavored milk in the 0.5 gallon package size than any of the 
other three sizes. The coefficient estimates on the “original” and “plain” flavor dummies are 
negative and statistically significant. These results suggest that within the 0.5 gallon package 
size, regular white milk products generate higher utility for the average consumer than flavored 
milk products. Among the three flavors of milk, vanilla is most preferred, followed by plain 
and original respectively. The ordering of preference over flavors of milk may in part be driven 
by the fact that the original flavor is sweetest and carries more calories compared to the flavors 
of vanilla and plain. 
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There are three types of milk in the package size of 32 ounces, which are: full lactose 
milk; reduced lactose milk; and soymilk. However, the number of observations for reduced 
lactose and soymilk products in the 32 ounces package size are sufficiently small such that our 
estimation cannot separately identify marginal utility parameters associated with these two 
types of milk products. As such, among the three types of milk products in the 32 ounces 
package size, we only include the full lactose dummy variable in the demand estimation. The 
coefficient estimate on the full lactose dummy variable is positive and statistically significant, 
revealing that the regular full lactose milk yields positive marginal utility relative to reduced 
lactose and soymilk for the average consumer.  
In the package size of 0.5 gallon there are five types of milk, including three types of 
dairy milk and two types of plant-based milk. The excluded milk type dummy variable from 
this regression model is Full Lactose.  As such, each of the four coefficient estimates on the 
milk type dummy variables included in the regression model compares consumers’ preference 
for the milk type in question relative to full lactose milk type. The four coefficient estimates 
on milk type dummy variables are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that relative 
to each of the other four milk types, full lactose milk yields higher utility for the average 
consumer. In other words, full lactose milk is the most preferred milk type among the five milk 
types considered. Among the other four milk types, reduced lactose is most preferred, followed 
by soy milk, almond milk, and milk with acidophilus respectively.   
The coefficient estimate on the “organic” dummy variable in the package size of 0.5 
gallon is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that although organic milk is free of 
hormones and antibiotics, consumers of milk products in 0.5 gallon packaging containers prefer 
purchasing non-organic to organic milk.. In contrast, consumers of milk products in 1 gallon 
packaging containers prefer purchasing organic to non-organic milk, as evidenced by the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate on the “organic” dummy variable.  
31 
From Panel B of Table 1.3, the variation in consumers’ sensitivity to price changes, as 
measured by the coefficient estimates on  𝑣 × 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒, are statistically significant in 
three package sizes except for 0.5 gallon, indicating that consumers are heterogeneous with 
respect to their responsiveness to price changes for the package sizes of 16 ounces, 32 ounces, 
and 1 gallon. In the package sizes of 16 ounces and 0.5 gallon, the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient estimates on the interaction variable of income with price, i.e. the 
coefficient estimates on 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 × 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒, suggest that consumers with higher 
incomes are less sensitive to price changes. In the package sizes of 32 ounces and 1 gallon, 
there is no evidence that consumers’ income level significantly influences their sensitivity to 
changes in milk price. Among all four package sizes of milk, consumers’ age does not seem to 






Table 1.3: Demand Estimation for Four Package Sizes of Milk 
 
Random Coefficients Logit Model  
Panel A:  Variables and Parameters in the mean utility function [parameters in 𝜃1 = (𝛽, 𝛼, 𝜌𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 , 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ, 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡)]. 
Size 1 (16 ounces container) Size 2 (32 ounces container) Size 3 (0.5 gallon container) Size 4 (1 gallon container) 
Coefficient Estimates Std. Error Coefficient Estimates Std. Error Coefficient Estimates Std. Error Coefficient Estimates Std. Error 
Real Milk Price -199.10** 9.56 -138.18** 22.97 -87.94** 16.94 -345.85** 83.54 
Fat Content (=1 if whole milk) a 1.76** 0.15 -1.18** 0.06 0.35** 0.03 -0.38** 0.10 
Flavor: Vanilla a -1.99** 0.04 0.08** 0.02 -1.19** 0.01 0.16** 0.04 
Flavor: Original a - - - - -1.38** 0.01 - - 
Flavor: Plain a - - - - -1.29** 0.01 - - 
Milk type: Full lactose a - - 2.16** 0.06 - - - - 
Milk type 1: Reduced lactose a  - - - - -0.87** 0.01 - - 
Milk type2: Milk with acidophilus a - - - - -3.40** 0.02 - - 
Milk type: Soy milk a - - - - -1.49** 0.01 - - 
Milk type: Almond milk a - - - - -2.12** 0.02 - - 
Organic (=1 if organic) a - - - - -0.03** 0.01 0.35** 0.04 
Constant a -0.32 0.48 1.35** 0.70 2.91** 0.28 -10.78** 0.09 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Product fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Market fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
 Panel B: Variables and Parameters that measure taste heterogeneity across Consumers [parameters in 𝜃2 = (Γ, Σ)]. 
𝑣 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡  -0.41 0.64 0.29 0.83 0.35 0.87 0.42 0.74 
𝑣 × 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 -20.97** 4.86 29.29** 4.94 4.31 18.48 71.44** 28.86 
𝑣 × 𝐹𝑎𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡       0.38 2.58 0.83 1.25 0.48       4.63 0.41 1.69 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 × 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 10.11** 2.16 1.65 13.22 9.00** 0.97 -5.83 143.83 
𝐴𝑔𝑒 × 𝐹𝑎𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 3.48 21.85 -5.71 5.10 3.02 25.04 -14.77 21.70 
GMM Objective Function Value 0.0088 0.0130 0.0152 0.0310 
Observations 21,114 29,901 158,439 45,267 
Notes: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
1 Reduced lactose also includes lactose free milk. 
2 The milk is full lactose with acidophilus 




Given the structural demand estimates, price elasticities of demand for each 
differentiated product can be calculated. Since a particular market is defined as the combination 
of time and geographic location, there are 420 unique markets in the dataset of each package 
size. So as to get a sense of own- and cross-price elasticities of products owned by Dean Foods 
and Foremost Farms, we select the markets located in Green Bay and Milwaukee in March 
2007, which is a time period prior to Dean Food’s acquisition of Foremost Farm’s two 
processing plants. 
In Table 1.4 we report mean own- and cross-price elasticities by select firms in our 
data.9 The firm-level means are obtained by averaging across the product-level elasticities 
based on the set of products owned by the relevant firms. The table shows mean own-price 
elasticity estimates ranging from -2.746 to -13.967.  The literature frequently shows lower own-
price elasticities for milk, however, the reported estimates in these studies are typically 
generated at a level more aggregated than the defined milk products used in our study. For 
example, Gould (1995) reported own-price elasticities of approximately -0.60 for reduced fat 
milk in the United States. In a study by Schmit et al. (2002), the total milk own-price elasticity 
is -0.243. Davis et al. (2009) pointed out that non-price product attributes play an important 
role in the empirical estimation of demand elasticities. In particular, when more non-price 
attributes are included in defining products and in demand estimation, then demand elasticity 
estimates found in the literature are in line with our estimates for all package sizes but the 16 
ounces package size, a package size that none of the studies in the relevant literature 
considered. For example, Lopez and Lopez (2009) reported own-price elasticities ranging from 
-1.9 to -2.4 for different brands of milk. Kinoshita et al. (2001) found elasticities ranging from 
                                                 
9 We also calculate the own- and cross-elasticities of Kemps since DOJ’s complaint mentioned that Kemps is a major competitor for Dean 
Foods and Foremost Farms in the five relevant markets. 
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-0.2 to -6.1 depending on the brand and location of purchase. Bonnet et al. (2015) found that 
own-price elasticities of demand for fluid milk vary between -1.79 and -6.56 based on an 
analysis of 25 brands and 7 retail stores. 
The mean of own-price elasticity estimates reported in Table 1.4 differ across the four 
package sizes. In particular, the evidence suggests that the typical consumers of milk products 
in 16 ounces packaging are most sensitive to price changes, i.e., milk products in this package 
size have the largest own-price elasticity estimates, ranging from -10.77 to -13.97. Among the 
other three package sizes, consumers of milk products in 1 gallon packaging are most sensitive 
to price changes, own-price elasticities ranging from -6.39 to -7.85, followed by the price 
sensitivities of consumers of milk products in 32 ounces (own-price elasticities ranging from -
4.749 to -5.96) and 0.5 gallon (own-price elasticities ranging from -2.75 to -3.40) packaging 
respectively. In Table 1.4, we only report the own- and cross-price elasticities for regular full 
lactose dairy milk. However, soy milk (brands: 8th Continent and Silk Light), organic milk 
(brands: Organic Valley, Horizon Organic and Wisconsin Organics), and reduced lactose dairy 
(brands: Deans Easy, Hood Lactaid, Land O’ Lakes Dairy Ease) all have larger own-price 
elasticities than regular full lactose dairy milk.10 All the cross-price elasticities are positive and 
statistically significant, but much smaller in absolute magnitudes than own-price elasticities.  
Among milk products contained in the package size of 16 ounces in the Green Bay 
market, the mean own-price elasticity of products owed by Dean Foods is smaller compared 
with mean own-price elasticity of products owed by Foremost Farms and Kemps respectively. 
However, among milk products contained in the package size of 16 ounces in the Milwaukee 
market, the dairy milk offered by Kemps have the lowest mean own-price elasticities compared 
with mean own-price elasticity of products owed by Foremost Farms and Dean Foods 
respectively. Referring to the cross-price elasticities, the dairy milk products offered by Dean 
                                                 
10 The own-price elasticities of brands owned by these 3 firms in the two selected markets are reported in the Appendix. 
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Foods are more substitutable with Foremost Farm’s dairy milk products rather than with 
Kemp’s dairy milk products. In the package size of 32 ounces, Dean Foods has the highest 
own-price elasticity in both selected markets, followed by Foremost Farms and Kemps. As in 
the package size of 16 ounces, dairy milk products with 32 ounces packaging offered by Dean 
Foods are still more substitutable with dairy milk products in this package size offered by 
Foremost Farms. 
Although in the package size of 0.5 gallon, consumers of Dean Food’s dairy milk 
products are the most sensitive to price change in the Green Bay market (highest mean own-
price elasticity), these products have the lowest own-price elasticity in the Milwaukee market. 
In both markets, the mean cross-price elasticity between dairy milk products of Dean Foods 
and Foremost Farms is still higher than the mean cross-price elasticity between dairy milk 
products of Dean Foods and Kemps.  Last, in the container size of 1 gallon, dairy milk products 
of Dean Foods have the lowest mean own-price elasticity in both markets. 
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Table 1.4: Mean Estimated Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities 
Market: Green Bay in March 2007  Market: Milwaukee in March 2007 
 Dean Foods Foremost Farms Kemps   Dean Foods Foremost Farms Kemps 
Size 1: (16 ounces)     Size 1 (16 ounces)    
Dean Foods -11.6194** 0.00028** 0.00016**  Dean Foods -10.9011
** 0.00103** 0.00080** 
 (0.1538) (5.51E-05) (3.00E-05)   (0.2031) (0.0001) (7.82E-05) 
Foremost Farms 0.00021** -12.7289** 0.00017**  Foremost Farms 0.00091
** -11.3917**  0.00102** 
 (4.83E-05) (0.5670) (3.00E-05)   (0.0001) (0.2751)  (0.0001) 
Kemps 0.00033** 0.00023** -13.9675**  Kemps 0.00099
** 0.00069** -10.7734** 
 (9.37E-05) (8.62E-05) (1.2329)   (8.15E-05) (5.57E-05) (0.2569) 
Size 2: (32 ounces)     Size 2: (32 ounces)    
Dean Foods -5.8992** 0.00033** 0.00025**  Dean Foods -5.9606** 0.00054** 0.00024** 
 (0.1505) (1.7E-05) (1.00E-05)   (0.1625) (4.55E-05) (1.29E-05) 
Foremost Farms 0.00017** -5.1577** 0.00022**  Foremost Farms 0.00013** -5.4278** 0.00014** 
 (1.30E-05) (0.1707) (1.30E-05)   (1.16E-05) (0.0576) (1.24E-05) 
Kemps 0.00016** 0.00028** -4.7496**  Kemps 0.00022
** 0.00044** -4.8710** 
 (2.30E-05) (2.50E-05) (0.1111)   (1.25E-05) (3.80E-05) (0.0270) 
Size 3: (0.5 gallon)    Size 3: (0.5 gallon)   
Dean Foods -2.8921** 0.00072** 0.00060**  Dean Foods -2.8055** 0.00040** 0.00020** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)   (0.0747) (3.00E-05) (2.00E-05) 
Foremost Farms 0.00022** -2.7460** 0.00059**  Foremost Farms 0.00025** -3.2638** 0.00020** 
 (2.52E-05) (0.0791) (8.82E-05)   (3.00E-05) (0.1975) (2.00E-05) 
Kemps 0.00023** 0.00072** -2.8616**  Kemps 0.00026
** 0.00042** -3.3990** 
 (2.93E-05) (9.36E-05) (0.1742)   (2.00E-05) (2.00E-05) (0.1111) 
Size 4: (1 gallon)   Size 4: (1 gallon)  
Dean Foods -6.3935** 0.02421** 0.03820**  Dean Foods -6.7046** 0.01265** 0.01307** 
 (0.1298) (0.0028) (0.0071)   (0.1643) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Foremost Farms 0.00728** -6.5634** 0.03968**  Foremost Farms 0.01872** -7.8493** 0.01812** 
 (0.0005) (0.1823) (0.0053)   (0.0018) (0.0660) (0.0011) 
Kemps 0.00746** 0.02560** -6.5869**  Kemps 0.01716** 0.01614** -7.2944** 
 (0.0008) (0.0032) (0.4200)   (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.1798) 
Noted: **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, standard error is reported in parenthesis.  
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1.5.3 Non-nested Test on Different Supply Models  
After estimating the demand model, we compute product-level markups and recover product-
level marginal costs for each of the four supply models. The non-nested likelihood ratio 
statistical test developed by Vuong (1989) is then performed to assess which model better 
approximates price-setting behavior during merger periods and divestiture periods 
respectively. As stated previously, we refer to merger periods as the time periods in our data 
over which Dean Foods owned the two dairy processing plants acquired from Foremost Farms, 
while divestiture periods are the time periods subsequent to Dean Foods’ divestiture of the 
Waukesha plant. 
According to the IRI dataset, beginning in January 2008 the ownership of milk product 
brands such as “Golden Guernsey” and “Morning Glory” changed from Foremost Farms to 
Dean Foods. As such, January 2008 is used as the effective beginning of the merger period 
associated with Dean Food’s acquisition of the two milk processing plants from Foremost 
Farms. On January 22, 2010, the Department of Justice (referred to DOJ) filed a complaint 
against Dean Foods, with the purpose to disassemble the acquisition. According to the DOJ’s 
final judgment of this case, Dean Foods divested one milk plant to Open Gate Capital in 
January 2012. As we subsequently make clear in the discussion, while the relevant merger 
periods differ across package sizes and relevant milk brands, all merger periods used in the 
analysis fall within the timeframe January 2008 to December 2011. Periods subsequent to 
January 2012 are used for the divestiture periods. 
 1.5.3.1 Non-nested Test on Different Supply Models: Merger Period 
 For milk products in 16 ounces package containers, there is only one milk brand 
“Golden Guernsey Morning Glory” involved in this merger. Based on the available dataset, 
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this milk brand was owned by Dean Foods from January 2008 to September 2009, therefore, 
we define the merger period from January 2008 to September 2009.   
Table 1.5 presents the non-nested test statistics for pairwise comparisons of the four 
supply models for milk products in 16 ounces package containers during the merger period. 
For Table 1.5 and subsequent tables that report non-nested test statistics, a positive statistic 
value in the table that is greater than 1.64 suggests that the model in the row is statistically 
preferred to the comparison model in the column, while a negative statistic value in the table 
that is less than -1.64 suggests that the model in the column is statistically preferred to the 
comparison model in the row. If the statistic value in the table lies between -1.64 and 1.64, then 
the two models being compared are statistically indistinguishable. Among the two supply 
models with active price-setting by manufacturers and retailers (Model 1 and Model 2), the 
supply model that assumes Dean Foods chooses to jointly price the newly acquired brands of 
milk products with its pre-existing brands of milk products (Model 1) is statistically preferred. 
Similarly, among the two supply models with active price-setting by manufacturers but passive 
retailers (Model 3 and Model 4), we again find that the supply model that assumes Dean Foods 
chooses to jointly price the newly acquired brands of milk products with its pre-existing brands 
of milk products (Model 3) is statistically preferred. As such, among milk products in 16 ounces 
package containers, the evidence is clear that Dean Foods chooses to jointly price the newly 
acquired brands of milk products with its pre-existing brands of milk products. Such 
cooperative price-setting behavior across Dean Foods’s pre-existing brands and brands 
previously owned by Foremost Farms validates the anticompetitive concern expressed by DOJ. 
However, the non-nested test statistics cannot distinguish whether the supply model with active 
price-setting retailers is preferred to the supply model with passive retailers. 
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Table 1.5: Results of Non-Nested Test of 16 Ounces Package Size during the Merger Period 
Merger period (Jan, 
2008 – Sep, 2009) 




Model 3: Active Price-
setting Manufacturers, 
but Passive Retailers 
(Cooperative pricing) 
Model 4: Active Price-
setting Manufacturers, but 
Passive Retailers (Non-
cooperative pricing) 




2.906** 0.779 0.782 
 













Model 3: Active Price-
setting Manufacturers, 










Notes: 1. A positive statistic value in the table that is greater than 1.64 suggests that the model in the row is 
statistically preferred to the comparison model in the column, while a negative statistic value in the table that is 
less than -1.64 suggests that the model in the column is statistically preferred to the comparison model in the row. 
If the statistic value in the table lies between -1.64 and 1.64, then the two models being compared are statistically 
indistinguishable. 2. **indicates that the two compared models can be statistically distinguished at the 5% level.  
 
In the package size of 32 ounces, there are three brands involved in the acquisition, 
“Golden Guernsey”, “Golden Guernsey Morning Glory” and “Morning Glory”. The ownership 
of all these three brands changed from Foremost Farms to Dean Foods in January 2008. 
However, the time periods over which Dean Foods owned these brands differ. The brands 
“Golden Guernsey” and “Golden Guernsey Morning Glory” were owned by Dean Foods from 
January 2008 to April 2010 and from January 2008 to December 2011, respectively, while the 
brand “Morning Glory” was owned by Dean Foods from January 2008 to December 2012. As 
such, for the package size of 32 ounces, we use as the merger period January 2008 to December 
2011. Table 1.6 presents the non-nested test statistics for pairwise comparisons of the four 
supply models for milk products in 32 ounces package containers during the merger period. 
The statistic values in Table 1.6 suggest that the supply model with active price-setting by 
manufacturers and retailers, and assumes Dean Foods chooses to separately price the newly 
acquired brands of milk products from its pre-existing brands of milk products (Model 2) is 
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statistically preferred when compared with each of the other three supply models. In other 
words, for milk products in 32 ounces package containers, Model 2 best approximates price-
setting behavior of firms during the merger period. This result is inferred from fact that the 
non-nested test statistic value in the first column of the table (-3.975) is negative and less than 
-1.64, while the non-nested test statistic values in the second row (4.44 and 4.43) are positive 
and greater than 1.64.  Such non-cooperative price-setting behavior across Dean Foods’s pre-
existing and newly acquired brands does not support the concern expressed by DOJ. 
Table 1.6: Results of Non-Nested Test of 32 Ounces Package Size during the Merger Period 
  
Merger period 


















































Notes: 1. A positive statistic value in the table that is greater than 1.64 suggests that the model in the row is 
statistically preferred to the comparison model in the column, while a negative statistic value in the table that is 
less than -1.64 suggests that the model in the column is statistically preferred to the comparison model in the row. 
If the statistic value in the table lies between -1.64 and 1.64, then the two models being compared are statistically 
indistinguishable. 2. **indicates that the two compared models can be statistically distinguished at the 5% level.  
 
In the package size of 0.5 gallon, there are two brands involved in the acquisition, 
“Golden Guernsey” and “Morning Glory”. The “Golden Guernsey” brand is produced by 
Waukesha plant, and therefore its ownership changed from Foremost Farms to Dean Foods in 
January 2008. However, according to DOJ’s final judgment, Dean Foods divested Waukesha 
plant to Open Gates Capital Cooperation in January 2012, as such, the ownership of this brand 
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changed again from Dean Foods to Open Gate in January 2012. The brand “Morning Glory” 
belongs to another milk plant located in De Pere, and Dean Foods maintained ownership of 
this plant even after DOJ’s divestiture order. Therefore, Dean Foods owned the brand “Morning 
Glory” from January 2008 through the end of our data set in December 2012. As such, in case 
of the 0.5 gallon package size, in order to analyze the pricing behavior of Dean Foods during a 
period in which it owned both of the newly acquired brands, we use for the merger period 
January 2008 to December 2011. 
Table 1.7 presents the non-nested test statistics for pairwise comparisons of the four 
supply models for milk products in 0.5 gallon package containers during the merger period.  
The statistic values in Table 1.7 suggest that the supply model with active price-setting by 
manufacturers, but passive retailers, and assumes Dean Foods chooses to jointly price the 
newly acquired brands of milk products with its pre-existing brands of milk products (Model 
3) is statistically preferred when compared with each of the other three supply models. In other 
words, for milk products in 0.5 gallon package containers, Model 3 best approximates price-
setting behavior of firms during the merger period. This result is inferred from fact that the 
non-nested test statistic values in the second column of the table (-33.531 and -33.531) are 
negative and less than -1.64, while the non-nested test statistic value in the third row (5.08) is 
positive and greater than 1.64. Such cooperative price-setting behavior supports the DOJ’s 
anticompetitive concern expressed in its complaint against Dean Foods. 
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Table 1.7: Results of Non-Nested Test of 0.5 Gallon Package Size during the Merger Period  
Merger period 



















































Notes: 1. A positive statistic value in the table that is greater than 1.64 suggests that the model in the row is 
statistically preferred to the comparison model in the column, while a negative statistic value in the table that is 
less than -1.64 suggests that the model in the column is statistically preferred to the comparison model in the row. 
If the statistic value in the table lies between -1.64 and 1.64, then the two models being compared are statistically 
indistinguishable. 2. **indicates that the two compared models can be statistically distinguished at the 5% level.  
 
Similar to the package size of 0.5 gallon, in the package size of 1 gallon, “Golden 
Guernsey” and “Morning Glory” are the two milk product brands involved in the acquisition. 
Furthermore, the merger period for milk products in 1 gallon package containers is the same 
as the merger period for milk products in 0.5 gallon package containers, January 2008 to 
December 2011. Table 1.8 presents the non-nested test statistics for pairwise comparisons of 
the four supply models for milk products in 1 gallon package containers during the merger 
period. It is evident from Table 1.8 that the non-nested test statistic values in the last column 
are negative and less than -1.64, suggesting that for milk products in 1 gallon package 
containers, Model 4 best approximates price-setting behavior of firms during the merger 
period. In particular, the supply model of active price-setting manufacturers, but passive 
retailers, which assumes Dean Foods chooses to separately price the newly acquired brands of 
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milk products from its pre-existing brands of milk products (Model 4) is statistically preferred 
when compared with each of the other three supply models. Such non-cooperative price-setting 
behavior by Dean Foods does not support the DOJ’s anti-competitive complaint.  
In summary, during the relevant merger periods we find evidence of anticompetitive 
price-setting behavior in support of the DOJ’s complaint against Dean Foods for milk products 
in 16 ounces and 0.5 gallon package containers, respectively. However, for milk products in 
32 ounces and 1 gallon package containers, the evidence is not supportive of Dean Food’s 
price-setting behavior being anticompetitive.  
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Table 1.8: Results of Non-Nested Test of 1 Gallon Package Size during the Merger Period 
Merger period 


















































Notes: 1. A positive statistic value in the table that is greater than 1.64 suggests that the model in the row is 
statistically preferred to the comparison model in the column, while a negative statistic value in the table that is 
less than -1.64 suggests that the model in the column is statistically preferred to the comparison model in the row. 
If the statistic value in the table lies between -1.64 and 1.64, then the two models being compared are statistically 
indistinguishable. 2. **indicates that the two compared models can be statistically distinguished at the 5% level.  
 
1.5.3.2 Non-nested Test on Different Supply Models: Divestiture Period 
As previously stated, the final judgment of DOJ requested Dean Foods to divest the 
Waukesha plant. To comply with the DOJ’s order, Dean Food’s sold the Waukesha plant to 
Open Gates Capital Cooperation.  As such, beginning in January 2012, milk products with the 
brand name “Golden Guernsey”, produced by the Waukesha plant, were owned by Open Gates 
Capital Cooperation instead of Dean Foods. In the IRI dataset, milk products with the brand 
name “Golden Guernsey” only exist in the package sizes of 0.5 gallon and 1 gallon. Therefore, 
we only perform non-nested statistical comparison tests across the different supply models for 
these two package sizes during the divestiture period, January 2012 to December 2012. 
Table 1.9 presents non-nested test statistics for pairwise comparisons of the four supply 
models for milk products in 0.5 gallon package containers during the divestiture period. The 
non-nested test statistics in the first and second row suggest that for milk products in 0.5 gallon 
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package containers, Model 1 and Model 2 better approximate price-setting behavior of firms 
during the divestiture period when each is compared to Model 3 and Model 4. A common 
feature of Model 1 and Model 2 is that they each assume active price-setting manufacturers 
and retailers. However, the difference between them is that Model 1 assumes milk products 
that belong to the divested brand, “Golden Guernsey”, are priced separately from the brands of 
milk products owned by Dean Foods, while Model 2 assumes milk products that belong to the 
divested brand are cooperatively priced with the brands of milk products owned by Dean 
Foods. The non-nested statistic value that compares Model 1 and Model 2 is 1.127, which is 
positive but less than 1.64, suggesting that these two models cannot be statistically 
distinguished. In other words, market equilibrium outcomes that correspond to milk products 
with the “Golden Guernsey” brand being priced separately from milk products owned by Dean 
Foods are not statistically different from market equilibrium outcomes that correspond to 
“Golden Guernsey” milk products being priced cooperatively with milk products owned by 
Dean Foods. As such, for milk products in 0.5 gallon package containers, there is no evidence 
that DOJ’s divestiture policy decision had a statistically significant impact on the market.  
  
46 
Table 1.9: Results of Non-Nested Test of 0.5 Gallon Package Size during the Divestiture Period 
Merger period 


















































Notes: 1. A positive statistic value in the table that is greater than 1.64 suggests that the model in the row is 
statistically preferred to the comparison model in the column, while a negative statistic value in the table that is 
less than -1.64 suggests that the model in the column is statistically preferred to the comparison model in the row. 
If the statistic value in the table lies between -1.64 and 1.64, then the two models being compared are statistically 
indistinguishable. 2. **indicates that the two compared models can be statistically distinguished at the 5% level.  
 
Table 1.10 presents non-nested test statistics for pairwise comparisons of the four 
supply models for milk products in 1 gallon package containers during the divestiture period. 
The non-nested test statistics in the second column are negative (-14.461 and -14.603) and less 
than -1.64, suggesting that Model 3 better approximates price-setting behavior when compared 
to Model 1 and Model 2.  Furthermore, non-nested test statistic in the third row is positive 
(4.229) and greater than 1.64, suggesting that Model 3 better approximates price-setting 
behavior when compared to Model 4. Therefore, for milk products in 1 gallon package 
containers, Model 3 best approximates price-setting behavior of firms during the divestiture 
period.  In particular, the supply model of active price-setting manufacturers, but passive 
retailers, which assumes the milk products that belong to the divested brand, “Golden 
Guernsey”, are priced separately from the brands of milk products owned by Dean Foods 
(Model 3) is statistically preferred when compared with each of the other three supply models. 
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As such, for milk products in 1 gallon package containers, this non-cooperative price-setting 
behavior across the divested brand of milk products and brands of milk products owned by 
Dean Foods is consistent with the objective of the DOJ’s divestiture policy decision. 
In summary, for milk products in 0.5 gallon package containers, there is no evidence 
that DOJ’s divestiture policy decision had a statistically significant impact on the market.  
However, for milk products in 1 gallon package containers during the divestiture period, the 
evidence of non-cooperative price-setting behavior across the divested brand of milk products 
and brands of milk products owned by Dean Foods is consistent with the objective of the DOJ’s 
divestiture policy decision. 
Table 1.10: Results of Non-Nested Test of 1 Gallon Package Size during the Divestiture Period  
Merger period 



















































Notes: 1. A positive statistic value in the table that is greater than 1.64 suggests that the model in the row is 
statistically preferred to the comparison model in the column, while a negative statistic value in the table that is 
less than -1.64 suggests that the model in the column is statistically preferred to the comparison model in the row. 
If the statistic value in the table lies between -1.64 and 1.64, then the two models being compared are statistically 
indistinguishable. 2. **indicates that the two compared models can be statistically distinguished at the 5% level.  
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1.5.4 The Percentage Changes in Markups Based on the Selected Supply Models 
During the relevant merger and divesture periods, we now know which supply models 
best approximate price-setting behavior across each package size of milk products. During the 
merger period, in support of the DOJ’s complaint against Dean Foods, we only find evidence 
of anticompetitive price-setting behavior for milk products in 16 ounces and 0.5 gallon package 
containers, respectively. However, it is interesting to learn the extent to which product price-
cost markups are higher owing to anticompetitive price-setting behavior. Only for milk 
products in 1 gallon package containers during the divestiture period, we found that the milk 
products belonging to the divested brand are priced separately from the brands of milk products 
owned by Dean Foods, which is a price-setting outcome consistent with the objective of DOJ’s 
divestiture policy decision. However, in an attempt to measure an impact of the DOJ’s 
divestiture policy decision on the 1 gallon package size milk products, we compute the extent 
to which product price-cost markups would differ if the milk products that belong to the 
divested brand were cooperatively priced with the brands of milk products owned by Dean 
Foods.  
Table 1.11 shows summary statistics on predicted percentage reductions in price-cost 
markups on products owned by Dean Foods during the merger period under the counterfactual 
scenario in which Dean Foods instead separately priced its newly acquired brands of milk 
products from its pre-existing brands of milk products. In case of milk products in 16 ounces 
package containers during the merger period, we report predicted reductions in price-cost 
markups based on counterfactual models with two distinct assumptions on the price-setting 
behavior of retailers, one in which retailers are active price-setters (Model 1) and the other in 
which they are passive (Model 3). The reason for using two distinct counterfactual models is 
that, for milk products in 16 ounces package containers during the merger period, the non-
nested statistical tests could not statistically distinguish the two models of cooperative price-
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setting manufacturers (Model 2 and Model 4), where Model 2 assumes active price-setting 
retailers and Model 4 assumes passive retailers. The summary statistics in Table 1.11 reveal 
that the magnitudes of the percentage reductions in price-cost markups are all sufficiently 
small, less than 3%, if Dean Food’s instead separately priced its newly acquired brands of milk 
products from its pre-existing brands of milk products, suggesting that anticompetitive effects 
should not be of concern.  
Table 1.11: Predicted Percent Changes in Estimated Price-Cost Margins  
of Dean Food’s Milk Products Based on Counterfactual Changes in Dean Food’s Price-
Setting Behavior during the Merger Period 
 
 
Active Price-setting Manufacturers, but 
Passive Retailers 




Min Max Mean Std. 
Error 
Min Max 
Size 1 (16 ounces) -0.003%** 3.09E-06 -0.361% 0 -0.001%** 1.43 E-06 -0.163% 0 
Size 3 (0.5 gallon) -0.053%** 8.18E-06 -2.467% 0     
Notes: **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
Table 1.12 reports the extent to which product price-cost markups would differ if the 
milk products that belong to the divested brand were cooperatively priced with the brands of 
milk products owned by Dean Foods during the divestiture period.  The summary statistics in 
the table show that under the counterfactual scenario in which the divested milk products are 
cooperatively priced with milk products owned by Dean Foods, then price-cost markups of 
milk products owned by Dean Foods will only increase by a mean 1.19%, with a maximum 
increase of 2.8%.  Note that predicted changes in price-cost markups for the divested products 
may either increase or decrease, but the absolute magnitudes of predicted markup changes on 
these products are less than 1%. In summary, the predicted changes in price-cost markups are 
sufficiently small, suggesting that divestiture effects are negligible.  
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Table 1.12: Predicted Percent Changes in Estimated Price-Cost Margins  
of Milk Products Owned, as Well as Products Divested, By Dean Foods during the 
Divestiture Period, where Predicted Percent Changes are Based on Counterfactual Changes in 
Price-Setting Behavior across These Products  
  
Active Price-setting Manufacturers, but Passive 
Retailer 
 Mean Std. Error Min Max 
Size 4 (1 gallon) 
Dean Foods’ currently 
owned products 
1.185%** 5.228E-04 0.315% 2.838% 
Dean Foods’ divested 
products 
0.101%** 2.635 E-04 -0.506% 0.634% 
             Notes: **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
On April 1, 2009, Foremost Farms sold two of its dairy processing plants to Dean 
Foods. The DOJ filed an antitrust suit on January 22, 2010 against Dean Foods with the purpose 
to disassemble the acquisition. DOJ’s complaint argued that this acquisition eliminated an 
aggressive competitor of the sale of fluid milk against Dean Foods in certain markets. In July, 
2011, the final judgment of this case required Dean Foods to divest one of the acquired plants. 
The paper examines two key issues of this case: (i) whether there exists evidence of 
anticompetitive price-setting behavior in support of the DOJ’s complaint against Dean Foods; 
and (ii) the effectiveness and impacts of DOJ’s final order of divestiture. 
During the period over which Dean Foods owned the newly acquired brands of milk, 
the merger period, we find evidence of anticompetitive price-setting behavior in support of the 
DOJ’s complaint against Dean Foods for milk products in 16 ounces and 0.5 gallon package 
containers, respectively. However, for milk products in 32 ounces and 1 gallon package 
containers, the evidence is not supportive of Dean Food’s price-setting behavior being 
anticompetitive during the relevant merger period.  
To comply with the DOJ’s order, Dean Food’s sold the Waukesha plant to Open Gates 
Capital Cooperation.  As such, beginning in January 2012, milk products with the brand name 
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“Golden Guernsey”, produced by the Waukesha plant, were owned by Open Gates Capital 
Cooperation instead of Dean Foods. In the IRI dataset, milk products with the brand name 
“Golden Guernsey” only exist in the package sizes of 0.5 gallon and 1 gallon. In case of milk 
products in 0.5 gallon package containers, we do not find any statistically significant evidence 
of a difference between market equilibrium outcomes if the divested products are cooperatively 
versus non-cooperatively priced with Dean Food’s own products. Therefore, for milk products 
in 0.5 gallon package containers, there is no evidence that DOJ’s divestiture policy decision 
had a statistically significant impact on the market. However, for milk products in 1 gallon 
package containers during the divestiture period, the evidence of non-cooperative price-setting 
behavior across the divested brand of milk products and brands of milk products owned by 
Dean Foods is consistent with the objective of the DOJ’s divestiture policy decision. 
In light of the evidences described above, the paper also examines the extent to which 
product price-cost markups would differ in the absence of anticompetitive price-setting 
behavior during the merger period. Furthermore, in order to provide a measured impact of the 
DOJ’s divestiture policy decision on milk products in 1 gallon package containers, we compute 
the extent to which product price-cost markups would differ if the milk products that belong to 
the divested brand were cooperatively priced with the brands of milk products owned by Dean 
Foods during the divestiture period. We find that the magnitudes of the percentage reductions 
in price-cost markups are all sufficiently small, less than 3%, if Dean Food’s instead separately 
priced its newly acquired brands of milk products from its pre-existing brands of milk products, 
suggesting that anticompetitive effects should not be of concern. Second, under the 
counterfactual scenario in which the divested milk products are cooperatively priced with milk 
products owned by Dean Foods, then price-cost markups of milk products owned by Dean 
Foods will only increase by a mean 1.19%, with a maximum increase of 2.8%.  Furthermore, 
predicted changes in price-cost markups for the divested products may either increase or 
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decrease, but the absolute magnitudes of predicted markup changes on these products are less 
than 1%. As such, the predicted changes in price-cost markups are sufficiently small, 
suggesting that divestiture effects are negligible.  
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Chapter 2- The Organic Food Price Premium and its Susceptibility 
to News Media Coverage: Evidence from the U.S. Milk Industry 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Consumer demand for organic food has been growing very fast in recent years.  According to 
Organic Trade Association (OTA), the U.S. sales of organic food increases from $17 billion in 
year 2007 to $44 billion in year 2016.  The annual growth rate of organic food sales reaches 
8.4 percent in 2016, handily outpacing the stagnant 0.6 percent grow rate of overall U.S. food 
market sales.  The organic sector now accounts for almost 5.3 percent of total food sales in 
United States, and its market share is expected to continue to expand over the next few years.  
The burgeoning consumer interest in organic food, and big market opportunities it has 
opened, urge economic researchers to study the driving forces behind this growing segment of 
markets.  There are a variety of reasons for the popularity of organic food, one explanation is 
that more and more consumers become aware of the benefits of eating organic food.  Compared 
with conventionally-grown food, organic food is grown or processed with less or no use of 
pesticides, antibiotics and growth hormones.  “People with allergies to foods, chemicals, or 
preservatives often find their symptoms lessen or go away when they eat only organic foods.  
Besides, organic farming practices are better for the environment as they reduce pollution, 
conserve water and increase soil fertility” (Robinson et al., 2018).  As people learn more about 
the benefits of consuming organic food on health as well as the environment, they are more 
likely to purchase from the organic sector.  Furthermore, consumers’ perception of the marginal 
quality difference between organic and conventional products allow firms to charge a price 
premium associated with the perceived quality difference.  
In this paper, we address the question of how the quantity of media coverage on organic-
related issues impacts the price premium associated with the perceived quality difference 
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between organic and conventional milk.  Milk is a major consumer product in the US and 54 
percent of Americans use it as a high quality protein source.  In traditional milk production, a 
genetically engineered hormone, rBGH, is injected into cows to increase the production. This 
issue, which is widely reported by mainstream media and press, raises consumers’ concerns 
about the safety of conventional milk and often steer them to healthier options, such as organic 
milk.  As such, we are not surprised by the finding that “People who don’t buy any other organic 
products are purchasing organic milk” (DuPuis 2000).  However, there has been different 
voices in the media about organic milk. For instance, an investigative report published 
by Washington Post points out some ‘organic’ milk may not actually be organic at all.  The 
Post reporter visited Colorado's Aurora Organic Dairy in 2016 and found that cows were not 
grazing in accordance with USDA organic standards.  The organic milk produced in that 
facility, after put through a battery of chemical tests, was not dramatically different from 
conventional milk.  These ongoing debates in media sources makes organic milk an interesting 
setting to study the influence of information dissemination on consumer shopping behavior, 
and the extent to which firms are able to exploit such shopping behavior as measured by an 
organic price premium.  
We first use a theoretical model to illustrate how media information may influence the 
price premium associated with consumer’s perception of the marginal difference between 
organic and conventional attributes of milk products.  It provides a theoretical foundation for 
the subsequent empirical analysis in which we use milk sales and media data to estimate the 
relationship between consumers’ willingness to pay for the organic feature of milk products 
and the intensity of organic-related news coverage.  
The empirical analysis comprises two steps.  In the first step, we estimate a random 
utility discrete choice model (Nevo 2003) to quantify consumers’ time-specific mean valuation 
of the organic feature of milk products. After controlling price, time, location and other product 
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characteristics, our estimation shows that on average consumers are willing to pay more for a 
milk product if it is labeled as organic.  To be precise, the average consumers’ willingness to 
pay for the organic feature of milk products is a mean $1.19/gallon, which corresponds to 
19.07% of the mean price per gallon of organic milk.  We interpret the $1.19/gallon as the 
average organic milk price premium. In the second step of the empirical analysis, we study 
how time-varying intensity of media coverage of organic milk affects consumers’ time-varying 
willingness to pay for the organic feature of milk.  We combine the estimates of consumer 
valuation of the organic feature of milk with media information data collected from LexisNexis 
Academic, and find that different media sources exhibit different effects on consumer 
valuation.  More newspaper coverage significantly increases consumers’ willingness to pay for 
the organic feature of milk, but this impact follows an inverted-U curve with a diminishing 
marginal effect.  TV and Radio news coverage are not found to have a significant effect on 
consumer valuation of the organic feature of milk.  
This paper joins the general literature studying the impacts of information disclosure 
on consumer food choices.  Many studies in this literature focus on health or nutrition labelling, 
a policy which is widely-used by states and federal governments to promote healthier food, and 
examine its impact on consumer behavior (Ippolito and Mathios 1995, Mathios 2000, Ippolito 
and Pappalardo 2002, Jin and Leslie 2003, Teisl and Roe 1998, Teisl, Bockstael and Levy 
2001, Teisl, Roe and Hicks 2002).  For example, Jin and Leslie (2003) show that a policy by 
LA County which requires restaurants to display hygiene grade cards causes consumers to 
become sensitive to restaurant hygiene and reduces the incidence of foodborne illness 
hospitalizations.  Teisl, Roe and Hicks (2002) find that the dolphin-safe label increased the 
market share of canned tuna.  Among this stream of studies, there are studies which are 
specifically centered on organic fluid milk market. Kiesel, Buschena and Smith (2005) indicate 
that voluntary labeling of the use of rBGH in retail fluid milk increases consumer demand for 
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rBGH-free milk and the estimated effects appear to have increased over time.  Kiesel and 
Villas-Boas (2007) show that USDA organic seal increases the probability of purchasing 
organic milk. 
Aside from examining the impacts of labeling policies, there are also studies analyzing 
consumer responses to food-related information circulated in various media sources.  
Shimshack, Ward, and Beatty (2007) use both parametric and non-parametric methods to 
examine consumer response to a national FDA advisory to limit store-bought fish consumption 
due to the dangers of methyl-mercury.  They find education and newspaper readership are 
important determinants of consumer response.  Schlenker and Villas-Boas (2009) study the 
reactions of consumer buying habits and financial markets to two health warnings about mad 
cow disease: The first discovery of an infected cow in December 2003 as well as health 
warnings about the potential effects aired in the highly-watched Oprah Winfrey show seven 
years earlier. They find a sharp drop in beef consumption and cattle futures following both 
warnings.  Using a differences-in-differences empirical analysis, Kiesel (2012) shows average 
increases of 5% in organic milk sales relative to conventional milk sales during weeks for 
which news coverage on organic food production is observed.  A key difference of our research 
from Kiesel (2012) lies in that we first use a structural random utility discrete choice model to 
directly estimate consumers’ time-specific mean valuation of the organic feature of milk 
products, and then recover how this time-specific mean valuation is influenced by the intensity 
of media coverage of organic-related news.  
The chapter proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we present a theoretical model to 
lay the theoretical foundation for the subsequent empirical analysis.  Section 2.3 describes the 
data used for analysis.  Section 2.4 outlines the empirical model and estimation procedure used 
to analyze the media coverage effect on consumers’ willingness to pay for the organic attribute 
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of milk.  Results are presented and discussed in Section 2.5, and section 2.6contains conclusion 
remarks. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Insights 
We use a theoretical model to show that media information may influence the price premium 
associated with consumer’s perception of the marginal difference between organic and 
conventional attributes of milk products.  Consider duopoly competition between two single-
product firms: one firm sells one-gallon package size of organic milk, while the other firm sells 
conventional milk of the same package size.  Therefore, we make the simplifying assumption 
that the two milk products are differentiated only by their organic/conventional feature.  A 
consumer’s indirect utility obtained from purchasing one unit of product 𝑗 is given by:  
𝑢𝑗 = 𝜃𝑞𝑗 − 𝑝𝑗                               (2.1) 
where 𝑗 = {𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐 (𝑜); 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 (𝑐)} denotes the type of milk; 𝑞𝑗 measures the 
consumer’s perceived quality of milk product 𝑗; and 𝑝𝑗 represents the price of milk product 𝑗.  
𝜃 represents consumer’s preference for quality, which we assume is a random draw from a 
uniform distribution on [0,1].  The closer a consumer’s draw of 𝜃 is to 1, the more the consumer 
values quality of the milk product. 
Suppose 𝑞𝑜 ≥ 𝑞𝑐, that is, a consumer perceives organic milk of higher quality than 




.  The demands for organic and conventional milk are respectively: 
    𝐷𝑜(𝑝𝑜, 𝑝𝑐; 𝑞𝑜 , 𝑞𝑐) = 1 −
𝑝𝑜−𝑝𝑐
𝑞𝑜−𝑞𝑐
        𝑎𝑛𝑑     𝐷𝑐(𝑝𝑜, 𝑝𝑐; 𝑞𝑜 , 𝑞𝑐) =
𝑝𝑜−𝑝𝑐
𝑞𝑜−𝑞𝑐
            (2.2) 
 and the variable profit functions of the two firms are: 
𝜋𝑜 = 𝐷𝑜(𝑝𝑜, 𝑝𝑐; 𝑞𝑜 , 𝑞𝑐) (𝑝𝑜 − 𝑐𝑜)       𝑎𝑛𝑑     𝜋𝑐 = 𝐷𝑐(𝑝𝑜 , 𝑝𝑐; 𝑞𝑜 , 𝑞𝑐) (𝑝𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐)      (2.3) 
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where 𝑐𝑗 is the pre-unit cost of type-𝑗 milk. We assume 𝑐𝑜 > 𝑐𝑐  based on the fact that 
production of organic milk has to comply with more stringent standards.  Firms non-
cooperatively and simultaneously choose price, 𝑝𝑗 , to maximize their own profit.  Nash 















               (2.4) 
Therefore, the theoretical model yields the following expression for the difference in 









                                        (2.5) 
Equation (2.5) reveals that the difference in equilibrium prices of organic and 
conventional milk depends on two key components: (i) the difference in consumer’s perception 
of the attributes of organic and conventional milk products, (𝑞𝑜 − 𝑞𝑐); and (ii) the difference 
in marginal cost of producing the two type of milk products, (𝑐𝑜 − 𝑐𝑐).  We define the organic 
price premium as the portion of the equilibrium price difference attributable to consumer’s 
perception of the marginal difference between organic and conventional attributes of milk 
products.  In other words, in equation (2.5) the organic price premium is captured by 
(𝑞𝑜−𝑞𝑐)
3
 .  
The consumer’s perceived quality difference between organic milk and conventional 
milk, (𝑞𝑜 − 𝑞𝑐), is influenced by the intensity of media coverage of organic milk according to 
the following function: 
𝑞𝑜 − 𝑞𝑐 = 𝑔(𝑓𝑜)                                     (2.6) 
where 𝑓𝑜 is a measure of the intensity of news coverage (perhaps measured by news item 
counts) about organic milk.  Note that the slope and curvature properties of function 𝑔(∙) 
determine the impact of relevant news media coverage intensity on consumer’s perceived 
quality difference between organic and conventional milk products.  The first-order derivative, 
𝑔′(∙), can either be positive or negative, depending on the stance the news takes about 
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organic milk, and how a consumer interprets the news.  Furthermore, equations (2.5) and 
(2.6) reveal that the impact of the intensity of news media coverage on the organic price 









𝑔′(𝑓𝑜)                                                          (2.7) 
The theoretical model reveals that the impact of the intensity of news media coverage 






 , directly depends on the impact of the intensity of news 
media coverage on consumer’s perceived quality difference between organic and conventional 
milk, 𝑔′(𝑓𝑜).  A key objective of the subsequent empirical analysis is to use data on 
consumer’s purchases of organic and conventional milk products to first generate dollar 
value time-varying estimates of consumers’ perceived quality difference between organic 
and conventional milk products, i.e., dollar value time-varying estimates of (𝑞𝑜 − 𝑞𝑐).  
Dollar value time varying estimates of (𝑞𝑜 − 𝑞𝑐) are effectively time-varying estimates of 
consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the organic feature of milk products.  We then 
use a secondary estimator to recover how the time-varying intensity of news media 
coverage on organic milk influences the dollar value time-varying estimates of 
consumers’ perceived quality difference between organic and conventional milk 









The empirical analysis uses Information Resources Inc. (IRI) retail point-of-sale scanner data.  
Information Resources Inc. is a Chicago-based marketing firm that uses scanning devices to 
collect point-of-sale retail data across 50 geographically distinct markets located in the United 
States. Fluid milk is one of the 30 product categories covered by IRI data, and is the product 
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category of interest for this research. The point-of-sale data are weekly and compiled according 
to Universal Product Code (UPC) transactions in retail stores. Since one gallon is one of the 
most popular package sizes of fluid milk purchased weekly, we focus on this package size sold 
in 187 retail stores that are spread across 5 distinct IRI markets located in the states of Illinois, 
Michigan and Wisconsin. The period examined spans from January 2006 to December 2012.  
We define a product as the unique combination of non-price characteristics and retail store, 
where the measured non-price characteristics are: brands, type of milk (full lactose versus Soy 
milk), flavor, fat content, organic versus non-organic classification, and package type 
materials.   
Milk consumption is measured by monthly aggregate quantity of each uniquely defined 
product purchased in a retail store within IRI markets.  For each product, price is computed as 
the average revenue (in dollars per gallon) obtained from sales of the uniquely defined product 
during the relevant month.  
For dairy processors, electricity is a major input in the production of fluid milk suitable 
for the retail market.  Electricity is intensively used in the processing of fluid milk due to need 
for water heating, cooling and refrigeration. As such, to capture a measurable determinant of 
production cost, we collected state level industrial electricity price data from U.S. Energy 
Information Administration. All price data are deflated by the consumer price index (index 
base year Jan 2008 =100).   
Several non-price product characteristic zero-one dummy variables were constructed to 
facilitate the empirical analysis. Table 1 reports summary statistics on product characteristic 
variables used in the empirical analysis.  One of the product characteristic dummy variables 
relates to milk type, where the two milk types in our data set are full lactose and soy. 
Specifically, the variable takes the value one if the milk is full lactose (92.55% of the milk 
products), but zero if the milk is soy (7.45% of the milk products).  There are three types of 
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milk flavor in the dataset, 92.55% of which is the regular white milk, followed by the flavor of 
vanilla (1.28%), and original (6.17%). We classify the fat content of dairy milk into two 
categories, whole milk (44.36% of the milk products) and non-whole milk.  In addition, we put 
plant-based milk products, such as soy milk, into the fat content category of non-whole milk.  
There is no single variable in the IRI dataset that is constructed with the purpose of 
identifying milk products that are organic.  As such, in order to identify organic milk products 
in the data we examine variables with various descriptive information on each product and 
classify the relevant product as organic if: (1) the brand description includes the word 
“organic”; or (2) the process description includes the phrases, “organic”, “organic 
homogenized”, “organic pasteurized”, “organic ultra-pasteurized”, or “organic pasteurized and 
homogenized”.  Based on this organic classification methodology we then constructed a zero-
one dummy variable that takes a value of one only when the relevant product is classified as 
“organic”. Organic milk products account for 20.08% of the milk products in our sample.   
Since materials used for making milk containers differ, we create a set of dummy 
variables to capture the range of container materials. Plastic, Carton and glass account for 
92.37%, 7.53% and 0.10% of the container packages, respectively. Consumer demographic 
information, such as income and age, are drawn from Public Use Microdata Sample database 
(PUMS).  
We assume that consumers learn information about organic dairy from the mass media. 
Although organic milk has been available for more than two decades, the sales of organic milk 
have become one of the fastest growing market segments as consumers who do not buy any 
other organic products are purchasing organic milk (DuPuis 2000). It is argued that the rapid 
and impressive rise in the sales of organic milk is linked to mainstream media coverage on the 
use of rBGH in cows to increase milk production (DuPuis 2000). To retrieve the volume of 
information related to organic dairy, we keyword search news and transcripts related to organic 
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dairy on LexisNexis Academic database. LexisNexis Academic database provides access to 
more than 3,000 worldwide newspapers, the transcripts from TV and radio and the legal and 
business research sources. We consider all national and local newspapers, as well as TV and 
radio transcripts to measure the volume of media coverage related to organic dairy. The 
numbers of searched-recovered articles or transcripts within each period are used as time-
varying measures of information intensity. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
Description 
 
Milk Size  (128 ounces = 1 gallon) 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Max Obs 
Real Milk Price (dollars per gallon)1 4.0205 1.4562 0.9786 10.3600 45,267 
Mean Personal Income(dollars per year) 36,042.13 3823.19 24806.06 41743.07 45,267 
IRI Market Population (per year) 5,239,710 3,513,091 96,527 9,108,058 45,267 
Age 45.2451 18.0210 15 95 45,267 
Real Electricity Price (cents per kWh) 6.1889 0.8065 4.2471 7.8745 45,267 
Milk Type Dummy Variables:      
     Full Lactose Milk 0.9255 0.2626 0 1 45,267 
      Soy Milk 0.0745 0.2626 0 1 45,267 
Flavor Type Dummy Variables:      
      Regular White 0.9255 0.2626 0 1 45,267 
      Vanilla 0.0128 0.1125 0 1 45,267 
      Original 0.0617 0.2406 0 1 45,267 
Fat Content Dummy (=1 if whole milk) 0.4436 0.4968 0 1 45,267 
Oragnic milk Dummy (=1 if organic) 0.2008 0.4006 0 1 45,267 
Package Type Dummy Variables:      
       Carton Package 0.0753 0.2639 0 1 45,267 
       Plastic Package 0.9237 0.2655 0 1 45,267 
       Glass Package 0.0010 0.0322 0 1 45,267 
Media Coverage Data      
     Number of organic-related news items reported in Newspapers (counts per month) 56.63 12.99    
     Number of organic-related TV and Radio transcripts (counts per month) 50.38 37.98    
                1. Prices to real dollars using the Consumer Price Index, with 2008 as the base year.
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Table 2.1 also reports summary statistics of the organic dairy-relevant news coverage 
data from Newspapers, TV and radio.  As shown in Table 1, the average number of organic 
dairy news articles from newspapers is 56 per month, and the average number of TV and radio 
transcripts per month related to organic dairy is about 50.  Figure 2.1 shows a time series plot 
of the intensity (measured by articles and transcripts counts) of news media coverage on 
organic dairy from newspapers, and TV and radio.  It is evident that the intensity of media 
coverage is relatively volatile overtime with a slight upward trend in intensity of TV and radio 
coverage prior to May 2008. 
Figure 2.1: Intensity of Organic Dairy News Coverages from Newspapers, TV and 
Radio over Time 
 
 
2.4 The Empirical Models 
2.4.1 Demand of Differentiated Products 
We model the demand for fluid milk using a random coefficients logit model (Berry, Levinsohn 
and Pakes 1995, Nevo 2000 and 2001).  Incorporating consumer demographics into the random 
coefficients logit model allows us to account for consumers’ taste heterogeneity for product 
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attributes, thus enabling more accurate computation of consumers’ willingness to pay for the 
organic attribute.  
The indirect utility consumer i obtains from purchasing milk product j in market t is 
specified as: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑥𝑗𝑡𝛽𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡    (2.8) 
where 𝑥𝑗𝑡 is a vector that includes several measured non-price product characteristics with the 
exception of the organic characteristic; and  𝛽𝑖 is the vector of consumer-specific taste 
parameters, i.e., marginal utilities, associated with the corresponding product characteristic 
variables in 𝑥𝑗𝑡. 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡 is a zero-one dummy variable that equals to one only if milk product 
j is classified as organic; and 𝜔𝑖 is a consumer-specific taste parameter which measures the 
consumer’s valuation of the organic characteristic of milk relative to the product being non-
organic.  Note that (𝑞𝑜 − 𝑞𝑐) in the simple theoretical model specified earlier, is effectively 
measured by 𝜔𝑖 in this more flexible empirical random utility model.  𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the price of product 
j in market t; and 𝛼𝑖 is the consumer-specific taste parameter that measures the consumer’s 
marginal utility of price.  𝜌𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟, 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ and 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 represent fixed effect controls for year, 
month, and geographic location of IRI market respectively.𝜉𝑗𝑡 represents product 
characteristics that are unobserved by us the researchers, but observed by consumers; and 𝑖𝑗𝑡 
represents the random component of utility that is assumed independent and identically 
distributed across consumers, products and markets.   










) + Γ𝐷𝑖 + Σ𝑣𝑖                                     (2.9) 
where 𝐷𝑖 is an m-dimensional column vector of demographic variables (assuming there are m 
distinct demographic variables), and each demographic variable enters the vector in the form 
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of deviation of individual i’s demographic variable from the mean of the market sample of 





)), where the parameters measure how taste characteristics vary with 
demographics; 𝑣𝑖 is a L-dimensional column vector of unobserved shocks to consumer taste 
for respective product characteristics; and Σ is a L-by-L diagonal matrix, where elements on 
the main diagonal are parameters that measure variation in taste due to the random shocks in 
𝑣𝑖.  
In the demand estimation, demographic variables in 𝐷𝑖 are income and age. Since 
variables in 𝐷𝑖 enter in deviations from mean, the mean of each variable in 𝐷𝑖 is zero. Following 
Nevo (2000), we assume that 𝑣𝑖 has a standard multivariate normal distribution, 𝑣𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝐼).  








) and the 
variance is equal to the square of the elements on the main diagonal of Σ.  
The mean utility across consumers obtained from consuming product j in market t, 𝛿𝑗𝑡, 
is given by: 
            𝛿𝑗𝑡 = 𝑥𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝜔𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡        (2.10) 
Consumer-specific deviations from the mean utility is given by:  
  𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 = (𝑥𝑗𝑡   𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡  𝑝𝑗𝑡) × (Γ𝐷𝑖 + Σ𝑣𝑖)     (2.11) 
Therefore, as in Nevo (2000), the indirect utility consumer i obtains from purchase of 
product j in market t in equation (2.8) can be rewritten in terms of mean utility obtained across 
all consumers in the market, and consumer i’s deviation from the mean utility, that is, 
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡                (2.12) 
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where 𝛿𝑗𝑡 is the mean utility, and (𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡) is the consumer-specific deviation from the mean 
utility. The consumer-specific utility deviations capture heterogeneous preferences across 
consumers, but these deviations by construction and assumptions have a mean of zero. 
The specification of the demand model is completed with the inclusion of an outside 
option/good denoted by good zero. The outside good allows for the possibility that consumer i 
may not purchase any of the products in a given market, and the mean utility of the outside 
good is normalized to be zero and constant over time. The indirect utility from this outside 
option is 𝑈𝑖0𝑡 = 𝑖0𝑡 = 0.  Assuming that 𝑖𝑗𝑡 is independent and identically distributed with 
an extreme value type I density, the predicted market share of product j in market t is given by 






  (2.13) 
where 𝐴𝑗𝑡 represents the set of consumers who choose product j in market t, ?̂?(𝐷) is the 
empirical distribution of demographic variables (income, age, etc.) in the market, and Φ(∙) is 
the standard normal distribution function.  Since there is no closed-form solution for the 
integral in equation (2.13), this integral must be approximated numerically using random draws 
from ?̂?(𝐷) and Φ(∙).11  
Based on the discrete choice model above, the demand for product j in market t is 
simply given by: 
𝑑𝑗𝑡 = 𝑠𝑗𝑡(𝑥𝑗𝑡 , 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡, 𝑝𝑗𝑡 , 𝜉𝑗𝑡; Θ) × 𝑀𝑡              (2.14) 
where Θ is the vector of demand parameters to be estimated, and 𝑀𝑡 is a measure of the 
potential market size of market t.  Specifically, Θ = (𝜃1, 𝜃2), where 𝜃1 = (𝛽,𝜔, 𝛼, 𝜌, 𝜏, 𝛾) and 
𝜃2 = (Γ, Σ).   
                                                 
11 We use 300 random draws from ?̂?(∙) and Φ(∙) for the numerical approximation of  𝑠𝑗𝑡(∙).  Consumer 
demographic information, such as income and age, are randomly drawn from Public Use Microdata Sample 
database (PUMS). 
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We construct the potential market size measure, 𝑀𝑡, in each market using the following 
procedure.  First, we obtained data on annual per capita dairy fluid milk consumption from 
United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA ERS).12  Since 
USDA ERS per capita dairy fluid milk consumption data are measured in liquid pounds, we 
converted the unit of measurement of these data to gallons, and divide by 12 to obtain average 
monthly per capita consumption of dairy fluid milk in gallons.  Second, even though we were 
not able to obtain per capita consumption of soy milk directly, we sourced data on annual total 
sales of soy milk in gallons,13 and divide these unit sales data by population size to obtain 
average annual per capita soy milk consumption. We then convert these average annual per 
capita soy milk consumption data to average monthly per capita soy milk consumption.  Third, 
monthly per capita milk (dairy and soy) consumption is obtained by summing monthly per 
capita consumption of dairy fluid milk and soy milk.  Last, potential market size measure, 𝑀𝑡, 
in each market is computed by using the population size of the relevant geographic market 
multiplied by monthly per capita milk consumption. 
 
2.4.2 Demand Estimation and Instruments 
Parameters of the demand model are estimated using Methods of Simulated Moments 
(MSM) algorithm outlined in Nevo (2000). We construct the MSM estimator by using 
instrumental variables that are orthogonal to product characteristics captured in 𝜉𝑗𝑡 that are 
unobserved to us but observed by firms and consumers. Instrumental variables for the product 
price of milk are needed because it is likely that 𝜉𝑗𝑡 is correlated with milk price.  
The variables used to instrument milk price are state-level electricity price for the 
industrial sector interacted with milk brand dummies.  It is reasonable to assume that an input 




price such as electricity price is uncorrelated with 𝜉𝑗𝑡, but highly correlated with milk price. 
For example, an unmeasured product-specific characteristic such as brand loyalty is most likely 
uncorrelated with state-level electricity price, but changes in the price of electricity would 
definitely influence milk prices.  In fact, in year 2006 the electricity consumption in dairy 
industry accounted for nearly 13% of the entire food industry electricity usage (U.S. DOE 
2006b). Furthermore, electrical energy use is increasing as milk manufacturers become highly 
automated.  The underlying intuition to interact the electricity price with milk brand dummies 
is to capture the likelihood that different milk products differentially uses electricity to arrive 
at the final milk product purchased by consumers, which in turn suggests that changes in 
electricity price should differentially affect final milk product prices.  For example, the brand 
“Silk” focus on soy milk production, which is likely to consume less electricity than processing 
cow’s milk. Another example is that the shelf life of organic milk is longer than conventional 
milk, because organic milk usually undergoes ultra-high temperature (UHT) processing or 
treatment, and conventional milk generally uses a standard preservation process. UHT requires 
higher electricity consumption, as such, electricity usage required by the production process is 
different across organic milk brands and conventional milk brands.  Yet another example in 
which electricity usage required by the production process likely differ across various milk 
brand products is based on the fat content present in the final milk product.  Monthly state-
level electricity price for the industrial sector are collected from U.S. Energy Information 
Administration. 
 
2.4.3 Measurement of Consumer Choice Behavior 
The primary objective of this paper is to evaluate if more media coverage related to 
organic dairy in newspapers, and on TV and radio influence the organic milk price premium, 
or equivalently, influence consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the organic attribute of 
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milk.  From the demand estimation we can obtain an estimate of the average consumer’s WTP 
for the organic attribute by dividing the estimate of the parameter on the organic dummy 
variable, 𝜔, by the estimate of the parameter on price, 𝛼, i.e. 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑡 =
𝜔𝑡
𝛼
, where 𝜔𝑡 is a time-
specific estimate of the parameter on the organic dummy variable.  We then apply a minimum-
distance estimation procedure discussed in Nevo (2000) to recover how time varying counts of 
media coverage related to organic dairy in newspapers, and on TV and radio influence 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑡.  
The minimum-distance estimation procedure effectively implements a feasible generalized 
least squares estimator of the following equation:   








   (2.15) 
where 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑡 is our demand model estimate of consumers’ willingness to pay for the organic 
attribute of milk during period t;  𝐼𝑡
𝑛𝑝
 measures the number of organic dairy news articles from 
newspapers during period t;  𝐼𝑡
𝑡𝑟 measures the number of organic dairy news transcripts from 
TV and radio during period t; and 𝑡
𝑤𝑡𝑝
 is a mean zero random error term that is a composite 
of non-media influences on consumers’ time-specific willingness to pay for the organic 
attribute of milk.   
There are two features of the 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑡 equation specification that are worth pointing out.  
First, we allow the 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑡 equation to capture the possibility that consumers’ current period’s 
willingness to pay for the organic attribute of milk is in part influenced by their previous 
period’s willingness to pay, thus capturing potential persistence in consumers’ willingness to 
pay for the organic attribute of milk.  Persistence in consumers’ willingness to pay for the 
organic attribute of milk may exist due to their preferences being rooted in a history of relevant 
information.  Second, 𝐼𝑡
𝑛𝑝
 and 𝐼𝑡





𝑡𝑟)2 are right-hand-side variables, which enable the specification to capture the possibility of 
declining marginal effect of news media information intensity on consumers’ current period’s 
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willingness to pay for the organic attribute of milk.  In other words, it is reasonable to 
hypothesize that as the volume of news media information increases during a given period, the 
marginal impact of additional news media information on consumers’ willingness to pay 
becomes less. 
 
2.5 Econometric Estimation and Inferences 
We first present and discuss the demand estimation results, which include estimates of the 
average consumer’s WTP for the organic attribute of milk. We then present and discuss 
estimation results on the relationship between consumer’s WTP for the organic attribute of 
milk and the intensity of news media coverage related to organic dairy. 
 
2.5.1 Results of Demand Estimation 
Demand model parameter estimates are reported in Table 2.2.  The second and third columns 
in the table report ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
results of the standard logit version of the demand model, while the other columns report 
method of simulated moments (MSM) estimation results of the random coefficients logit 
version of the demand model.  Consistent with economic theory, the OLS and 2SLS coefficient 
estimates on price are negative and statistically significant. However, a Wu-Hausman test is 
performed to examine the endogeneity of price, and the result of this test, which is also reported 
in the table, provides strong evidence that price is endogenous.  As such, instruments are needed 
for price.  The remainder of the discussion focusses on results from the random coefficients 
logit version of demand model rather than the standard logit version since the random 
coefficients logit is better able to capture heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences. 
The negative and statistically significant coefficient on price reveals that, on average, 
consumers’ level of utility is inversely related to the price of the product.  As such, consistent 
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with expectation, if non-price product characteristics across competing products are equal, then 
our estimated price effect suggests that consumers will choose the milk product that has the 
lower price. 
The coefficient estimate on the soy milk dummy variable is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that after controlling for other factors that may influence milk demand, 
the average consumer obtains higher utility by purchasing soy milk compared to dairy milk. 
The coefficient estimate on the fat content dummy variable is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels of statistical significance, suggesting that, on average, consumers seem to 
be indifferent between whole milk and non-whole milk.  The coefficient estimate on the milk 
flavor dummy variable is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that compared with 
vanilla flavor, consumers prefer regular white milk and original milk.  The vanilla flavoring 
added to milk can either be artificial or real, and vanilla extract often contains alcohol.  As 
such, this result is consistent with argument that consumers may prefer to avoid milk products 
with added vanilla flavoring for health reasons.  The statistically insignificant coefficient 
estimate on the container package material dummy variable, suggests that consumers are 
indifferent between milk package materials (plastic, glass or carton) when choosing between 
milk products. 
The parameter estimates that capture taste heterogeneity across consumers are 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels of statistical significance. We may interpret 
these results as suggesting that heterogeneity across consumers does not play a significant role 
in explaining consumer choice behavior across various milk products. This narrative on the 
apparent inconsequential role that consumer heterogeneity plays in milk demand is not 
surprising since product differentiation across milk products is relatively small compared to 
many other industries. 
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The most important milk product attribute for this research is whether or not the product 
is organic.  The coefficient estimate on the organic dummy variable is positive and statistically 
significant suggesting that, on average, consumers prefer organic milk products to other milk 
products.   
Consumers’ WTP for the organic attribute of milk is computed by dividing the 
coefficient estimate of the organic dummy variable by the price coefficient estimate.  The 
division of these coefficient estimates suggest that the average consumer is willing to pay 
$1.19/gallon extra for the organic attribute of milk products, which corresponds to 19.07% of 
the mean price per gallon of organic milk.  In other words, parameter estimates from our 
demand model suggest that the average organic price premium for milk is $1.19 per gallon. 
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Table 2.2: Results from Demand Model Estimation 
 Standard Logit Random Coefficients Logit 


















Panel A       
Real Milk Price -46.8762** -219.2512** -219.1708** -0.9254  -0.6994 





















Milk type: soy milk 4.1794** 6.5263** 6.5185**    
 (0.4306) (0.6119) (0.8090)    






   
Package: Plastic 3.3937** -0.0051 -0.0046    







   
Time fixed effects YES YES YES    
Brand fixed effects YES YES YES    
Retail store fixed effects YES YES YES    
Market fixed effects YES YES YES    
R2 0.8726      
Wu-Hausman (𝜒2)  311.703 
(p-value = 
0.0000) 
    
MSM Objective     0.0109  
Panel B       
Real Milk Price -47.2352** -228.0709** -237.0716** -7.8708  -0.7999 





















Milk type: soy milk 4.2554** 6.7418** 6.7972**    
 (0.4289) (0.6177) (0.7024)    






   
Package: Plastic 3.4533** -0.1300 -0.1628    
 (0.1519) (0.3392) (04303)    
Organic * time periods YES YES YES    
Time fixed effects YES YES YES    
Brand fixed effects YES YES YES    
Retail store fixed effects YES YES YES    
Market fixed effects YES YES YES    
R2 0.8738      
Wu-Hausman (𝜒2)  341.257 
 (p-value = 
0.0000) 
    
MSM Objective     0.0125  
       
Observations 45,267 45,267   45,267  
Note: All regressions include yearly dummies, monthly dummies, geographic market location dummies, brand dummies and retail store 




To facilitate the next portion of our empirical analysis we need to obtain time-specific 
estimates of consumers’ WTP for the organic attribute of milk.  As such, we re-estimate a 
modified specification of the demand model, where the key modification is to replace the 
organic dummy variable with interactions of the organic dummy variable with 84 time period 
dummy variables.  The results of this modified demand model estimation are shown in the 
lower panel (Panel B) of Table 2.2.  Importantly, a comparison of the estimation results across 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 2.2 reveals that moving to time-specific controls of the organic 
attribute has not changed the qualitative results of the other demand variables previously 
discussed.   
The coefficient estimates of the interactions of organic dummy with 84 time periods 
dummy variables are reported in the Appendix, and all of these coefficient estimates are 
positive and statistically significant at 5% level. These 84 coefficient estimates are divided by 
the coefficient estimate on price to obtain time period-specific estimates of consumers’ WTP 
for the organic attribute of milk.  Figure 2.2 plots the time period-specific estimates of 
consumers’ WTP for the organic attribute of milk over the periods January 2006 to December 
2012. The figure does show evidence of fluctuations in consumers’ WTP for the organic 
attribute of milk.  We now evaluate the extent to which these fluctuations are influenced by 
fluctuations in the intensity of media coverage on organic dairy issues. 
  
76 




2.5.2 Media Effects on Consumers’ Willingness to Pay for the Organic Attribute 
of Milk. 
Once time varying estimates of consumers’ WTP for the organic attribute of milk are obtained, 
facilitated by equation (2.15), we use the minimum-distance estimation procedure outlined in 
Nevo (2000) to recover how the WTP estimates are influenced by fluctuations in the intensity 
of media coverage on organic diary issues.  Table 2.3 reports parameter estimates of various 
restricted specifications of equation (2.15).  The first column of Table 2.3 reports the most 
general specification of equation (2.15), which include measuring linear and quadratic impacts 
on WTP of the intensity of news media coverage of organic dairy information from both 
newspapers articles, and TV and radio transcripts.  
From the second column of Table 2.3, we find evidence of a quadratic relationship 
between consumers’ WTP for the organic characteristic and the intensity of media coverage on 
organic dairy issues from newspaper.  Specifically, the coefficient estimates on newspaper 
article counts and the square of newspaper article counts suggest that each additional organic 
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dairy newspaper article increases consumers’ WTP for the organic characteristic up to a 
monthly article count of 56, but decreases consumers’ WTP with each additional monthly 
article beyond 56 articles.14  Within the news coverage intensity range in which each additional 
newspaper article on organic dairy issues has positive marginal effect on consumers’ WTP for 
the organic characteristic, the estimated marginal effect is diminishing with each additional 
article, where the highest positive marginal effect is equivalent to an increase in WTP of 0.76 
cents per gallon associate with the first article of the month. The second, fourteenth, twenty 
eighth, and forty second articles of the month increase consumers’ WTP by 0.75, 0.58, 0.39, 
and 0.20 cents per gallon respectively.15   
Table 2.3: Influence of Media Coverage on Consumers’ WTP for the Organic Attribute of Milk 
 
Dependent Variable: Consumers’ time-specific WTP for the Organic Attribute of 
Milk 
 (1) (2) (3) 
One period lagged dependent variable 0.0887** 0.1007** 0.0904** 
 (0.0166) (0.0163) (0.0166) 
Newspaper article counts  0.00769** 0.00761**  
 (0.00288) (0.00288)  
TV and Radio transcripts counts -4e-05  -5.3e-05 
 (0.00060)  (0.00057) 
Quadratic Newspaper article counts -6.4e-05** -6.8e-05**  
 (2.38e-05) (2.38e-05)  
Quadratic TV and Radio transcripts counts  -3.7e-06  -3.7e-06 
 (3.3e-06)  (3.23e-06) 
Constant -0.7469** -0.7478** -0.5497** 
 (0.0960) (0.0943) (0.0614) 
Number of observations  83 83 83 
Notes: The data used for estimating regressions in this table are monthly time-series.  The values of the 
dependent variable in these regressions are the time-specific willingness to pay estimates of the organic 
attribute of milk computed from parameter estimates from the discrete choice milk demand model. The 
regressions are estimated using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). Standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, **indicates statistical significance at 
the 5% level. 
                                                 
14 The threshold newspaper article count of 56 is obtained by solving the following linear equation for Newspaper 
Article Count: 0.0076 – 2*0.000068 * (Newspaper Article Count) = 0, which yields Newspaper Article Count = 
0.00761/2*(0.000068).  Note that this linear equation used to solve for the threshold newspaper article count is 
derived from the regression estimates in column 2 of Table 3, by setting to zero the marginal effect of WTP with 
respect to Newspaper Article Counts. 
15 The estimated positive marginal effect of 0.75 cents per gallon for the second article is computed from the 
coefficients in column 2 as follows: [0.0076 – 2*0.000068 (1)] * 100.  The marginal effects of 0.58 and 0.39 cents 
per gallon for the fourteenth and twenty eighth articles respectively, are computed from the coefficients as follows:  
[0.0076 – 2*0.000068 (13)] * 100 and [0.0076 – 2*0.000068 (27)] * 100, respectively. 
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The positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate on the lagged dependent 
variable provides evidence of habit persistence in consumers’ willingness to pay for the organic 
characteristic of milk, i.e., consumers’ current period’s willingness to pay for the organic 
attribute of milk is in part influenced by their previous period’s willingness to pay.  We can 
also use the coefficient estimate on the lagged dependent variable to facilitate computing long-
run marginal effects on consumers’ willingness to pay for the organic characteristic of milk 
associated with each additional organic dairy newspaper article.  For example, we stated above 
that the first newspaper article of the month increases consumers’ WTP by 0.76 cents per 
gallon, but this is a short-run marginal effect estimate. Over the long-run the marginal effect 
on consumers WTP of the first newspaper article of the month is 0.84 cents per gallon, which 
is computed as follows: [0.0076/(1 – 0.10)]*100.  Analogously, the long-run marginal effects 
on consumers’ WTP of the second, fourteenth, twenty eighth, and forty second articles of the 
month are 0.83, 0.64, 0.43, and 0.22 cents per gallon respectively. 
As evidenced in the first and third columns of estimates, we do not find a statistically 
significant impact of the number of transcripts on organic dairy issues from TV and radio on 
consumers’ WTP for the organic attribute of milk. What media consumption patterns might 
explain the evidence that organic dairy information transmitted via newspaper impacts 
consumers’ WTP for the organic attribute of milk, but similar information transmitted via TV 
and radio has no statistically discernable impact on consumers’ WTP for the organic attribute 
of milk?  According to the annual Jacobs Media Techsurvey,16 the primary motivation for 
listening to AM/FM radio is to hear favorite songs, as 53.3% of the respondents cited this as 
the main reason to be radio listeners.  Only 21.7% of the respondents stated that the main reason 
to listen AM/FM radio was to stay informed about the news, traffic or weather.  According to 
                                                 




the annual American Time Use Survey (ATUS), watching TV is the leisure activity that most 
occupied adults’ leisure time.  Among the top 250 TV programs in the U.S., 33% of the most 
popular programs are drama shows, followed by comedy (18%), participatory/reality (17%), 
news (15%) and sports (10%).  Although the circulation of newspapers has been falling since 
2003,17 newspapers are still the critical part of the American news landscape.  Therefore, since 
the main reason for listening to radio and watching TV is to be entertained rather than to be 
informed, such media consumption preference patterns are consistent with the evidence that 
organic dairy information transmitted via newspaper impacts consumers’ WTP for the organic 
attribute of milk, but similar information transmitted via TV and radio has no statistically 
discernable impact on consumers’ WTP for the organic attribute of milk.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Consumers’ perception of the marginal quality difference between organic and 
conventional products allow firms to charge a price premium associated with the perceived 
quality difference.  We refer to this price premium as the organic price premium.  The organic 
price premium is equivalent to consumers’ willingness to pay for the organic attribute.  In this 
paper, we address the question of how the quantity of media coverage on organic dairy issues 
impacts the organic milk price premium.  
We first use a theoretical model to illustrate how media information may influence the 
organic price premium, which provides a theoretical foundation for the subsequent empirical 
analysis in which we use milk sales and media data to estimate the relationship between 
consumers’ willingness to pay for the organic feature of milk products and the intensity of 
organic-related news coverage. 
                                                 
17 Pew research center: http://www.journalism.org/chart/newspaper-circulation-falls-in-2014/ 
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First, our empirical analysis reveals that, on average, consumers are willing to pay 
$1.19/gallon more for the organic attribute of milk, which corresponds to 19.07% of the mean 
price per gallon of organic milk.  In other words, we estimate that on average the organic price 
premium for milk products is approximately 29% of the price per gallon.  Second, we find 
evidence of a quadratic relationship between consumers’ WTP for the organic attribute of milk 
and the intensity of media coverage on organic dairy issues from newspaper.  Specifically, each 
additional organic dairy newspaper article increases consumers’ WTP for the organic 
characteristic up to a monthly article count of 56, but decreases consumers’ WTP with each 
additional monthly article beyond 56 articles.  Within the news coverage intensity range in 
which each additional newspaper article on organic dairy issues has positive marginal effect 
on consumers’ WTP for the organic attribute, the estimated marginal effect is diminishing with 
each additional article, where the highest positive marginal effect is equivalent to an increase 
in WTP of 0.76 cents per gallon associate with the first article of the month.  Interestingly, we 
do not find a statistically significant impact of the number of transcripts on organic dairy issues 
from TV and radio on consumers’ WTP for the organic attribute of milk, which may be partly 
driven by survey evidence suggesting that consumers’ main reason for listening to radio or 
watching TV is to be entertained rather than to be informed.   
Last, we find evidence of habit persistence in consumers’ willingness to pay for the 
organic characteristic of milk, i.e., consumers’ current period’s willingness to pay for the 
organic attribute of milk is in part influenced by their previous period’s willingness to pay.  
Such habit persistence is likely influenced by, among other things, the history of news media 
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This Appendix contains six tables (Table A.1-A.9). Table A1 presents the standard logit demand estimation results using Ordinary Least Square (OLS). Table A2 reports the standard logit demand estimation results using two-
stage least squares (2SLS). Table A.3-A.9 present the own- and cross-price elasticities of different brands in four package sizes in two selected markets. 
Table A.1: Standard Logit Demand Estimation for Four Package Sizes of Milk (OLS) 
 Ordinary Least Square Estimation (OLS) 
 
Variables and Parameters in the mean utility function [parameters: (𝛽, 𝛼, 𝜌𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 , 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ, 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡)]. 
Size 1 (16 ounces Container) Size 2 (32 ounces Container) Size 3 (0.5 gallon Container) Size 4 (1 gallon Container) 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Real Milk Price -47.81** 0.59   -21.00** 0.54 -32.59** 0.27      -39.12** 0.75 
Fat Content a -0.79** 0.012 -1.03** 0.01 -1.23** 0.004 -1.47** 0.01 
Flavor: Vanilla a -1.55** 0.03 0.10** 0.02 -1.47** 0.01 -0.06* 0.03 
Flavor: Original a - - - - -1.64** 0.01 - - 
Flavor: Plain a - - - - -1.38** 0.01 - - 
Milk type: Full lactose a - - 2.30** 0.03 - - - - 
Milk type 1: Reduced lactose a  - - - - -1.09** 0.01 - - 
Milk type2: Milk with 
acidophilus a - - - - -4.02** 0.02 - - 
Milk type: Soy milk a - - - - -0.75** 0.01 - - 
Milk type: Almond milk a - - - - -1.78** 0.02 - - 
Organic a - - - - -0.72** 0.01 -1.14** 0.02 
Constant a -0.58** 0.19 0.83** 0.27 2.99** 0.10 -11.22** 0.10 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Product fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Market fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.9967 0.9984 0.9980 0.9961 
Observations 21,114 29,901 158,439 45,267 
Notes: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
1 Reduced lactose also includes lactose free milk. 
2 The milk is full lactose with acidophilus 
a Coefficient estimates from the Generalized Least Square regression of estimated product fixed effects on non-price product characteristics. 
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Table A.2: Standard Logit Demand Estimation for Four Package Sizes of Milk (2SLS) 
 
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation (2SLS) 
Variables and Parameters in the mean utility function [parameters: (𝛽, 𝛼, 𝜌𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 , 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ, 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡)]. 










Estimates Std. Error 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Real Milk Price -169.37** 2.41 -87.35** 2.41 -69.95** 1.38 -232.16** 8.46 
Fat Content a -0.79** 0.02 -1.03** 0.01 -1.23** 0.004 -1.42** 0.01 
Flavor: Vanilla a -1.68** 0.05 0.10** 0.02 -1.43** 0.01 -0.13** 0.05 
Flavor: Original a - - - - -1.59** 0.01 - - 
Flavor: Plain a - - - - -1.39** 0.01 - - 
Milk type: Full lactose a - - 2.26** 0.05 - - - - 
Milk type 1: Reduced lactose a  - - - - -0.92** 0.01 - - 
Milk type2: Milk with 
acidophilus a - - - - -3.82** 0.02 - - 
Milk type: Soy milk a - - - - -0.85** 0.02 - - 
Milk type: Almond milk a - - - - -1.80** 0.02 - - 
Organic a - - - - -0.60** 0.01 0.24** 0.05 
Constant a -031 0.32 0.82** 0.34 2.95** 0.11 -10.14** 0.16 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Product fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Market fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 21,114 29,901 158,439 45,267 
Test of Endogeneity: 
𝐻0: Real Milk Price is 
Exogenous 
Dubin (score) Chi-sq (1) 9605.71  (P-Value = 0.00) 1242.33 (P-Value = 0.00)  867.63 (P-Value = 0.00) 1324.44 (P-Value = 0.00) 
Wu-Hausman F(1, 20480)  17094.2   (P-Value = 0.00) 1248.59 (P-Value = 0.00) 841.21 (P-Value = 0.00) 1322.17 (P-Value = 0.00) 
Notes: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
1 Reduced lactose also includes lactose free milk. 
2 The milk is full lactose with acidophilus 
a Coefficient estimates from the Generalized Least Square regression of estimated product fixed effects on non-price product characteristics. 
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Table A.3: The Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities of Different Brands in 16 Ounces Containers 
Market: Green Bay in March 2007 Market: Milwaukee in March 2007 
Brands Deans Golden 
Grnsy Mg 
Kemps Brands Deans Golden 
Grnsy Mg 
     Kemps  
Deans -11.6194** 0.00028** 0.00016** Deans -10.9011** 0.00103** 0.00080**  
 (0.1538) (5.51E-05) (3.00E-05)  (0.2031) (0.0001) (7.82E-05)  
Golden Grnsy Mg 0.00021** -12.7289** 0.00017** Golden Grnsy Mg 0.00091** -11.3917**   0.00102**  
 (4.83E-05) (0.5670) (3.00E-05)  (0.0001) (0.2751)   (0.0001)  
Kemps 0.00033** 0.00023** -13.9675** Kemps 0.00099** 0.00069** -10.7734**  
 (9.37E-05) (8.62E-05) (1.2329)  (8.15E-05) (5.57E-05) (0.2569)  
Noted: **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, standard error is reported in parenthesis. Deans is owned by Dean Foods and Golden 
Grnsy Mg is owned by Foremost Farms  
 
Table.A.4: The Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities of Different Brands in 32 Ounces Containers 
 
Market: Green Bay in March 2007     












Deans -7.9296** 0.00021** 0.00073** 0.00087** 0.00050** 0.00068** 0.00060** 0.00152** 
 (0.0771) (3.06 E-05) (2.74 E-05) (7.50 E-05) (7.12 E-05) (6.45 E-05) (4.00 E-05) (0.0002) 
Deans Easy 0.00076** -9.5570** 0.00104** 0.00127** 0.00068** 0.00107** 0.00083** 0.00225** 
 (0.00017) (0.4191) (0.0001) (0.0002) (2.19 E-04) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0005) 
Golden Guernsey 0.00049** 0.00019** -7.7561** 0.00082** 0.00048** 0.00063** 0.00057** 0.00144** 
 (8.87E-05) (5.39 E-05) (0.3358) (0.0001) (1.22 E-04) (0.0001) (7.01 E-05) (0.0003) 
Golden Grnsy Mg 0.00048** 0.00019** 0.00067** -7.4949** 0.00046** 0.00063** 0.00056** 0.00141** 
 (6.13 E-05) (3.62 E-05) (3.57 E-05) (0.2206) (8.32 E-05) (7.56 E-05) (4.91 E-05) (0.0002) 
Morning Glory 0.00033** 0.00012** 0.00047** 0.00056** -5.9877** 0.00040** 0.00041** 0.00097** 
 (5.21 E-05) (2.92 E-05) (3.27 E-05) (7.56 E-05) (0.3531) (6.01 E-05) (4.59 E-05) (0.00065) 
Hood Lactaid 0.00085** 0.00037** 0.00117** 0.00142** 0.00075** -10.1274** 0.00092** 0.00253** 
 (0.0001) (7.54 E-05) (6.25 E-05) (0.0002) (1.46 E-04) (0.0520) (8.31 E-05) (0.0003) 
Kemp 0.00037** 0.00014** 0.00052** 0.00062** 0.00037** 0.00045** -6.4341** 0.00107** 
 (6.61 E-05) (3.78 E-05) (3.63 E-05) (9.51 E-05) (9.67 E-05) (7.68 E-05) (0.2501) (0.0002) 
Private Label 0.00050** 0.00020** 0.00070** 0.00084** 0.00048** 0.00065** 0.00058** -7.6429** 
 (7.02 E-05) (4.25 E-05) (4.30 E-05) (0.0001) (9.47 E-05) (8.81 E-05) (5.66 E-05) (0.3106) 
Noted: **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, standard error is reported in parenthesis. The brands of Dean Easy and Hood 
Lactaid are reduced lactose dairy milk, Deans and Deans Easy are owned by Dean Foods; Golden Guernsey, Golden Grnsy Mg and Morning 
Glory are owned by Foremost Farms. 
 
Table A.5: The Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities of Different Brands in 32 Ounces Containers 
Market: Milwaukee in March 2007    








Deans  -8.5463** 0.00003** 0.00057** 0.00017** 0.00011** 0.00077** 
 (0.1984) (1.94 E-06) (5.24 E-05) (1.05 E-05) (4.76 E-06) (4.46 E-05) 
Deans Easy 0.00025** -10.5024** 0.00072** 0.00021** 0.00015** 0.00102** 
 (3.09 E-05) (0.1791) (0.0002) (2.81 E-05) (1.36 E-05) (0.0001) 
Golden Guernsey 0.00018** 0.00003** -7.7286** 0.00016** 0.00010** 0.00068** 
 (1.51 E-05) (2.47 E-06) (0.0952) (1.47 E-05) (6.22 E-06) (5.49 E-05) 
Kemps 0.00016** 0.00003** 0.00047** -7.0822** 0.00009** 0.00060** 
 (8.18 E-06) (1.29 E-06) (3.97 E-05) (0.0377) (3.33 E-06) (2.76 E-05) 
Hood Lactaid 0.00026** 0.00005** 0.00073** 0.00021** -10.576** 0.00103** 
 (1.61 E-05) (2.84 E-06) (7.50 E-05) (1.47 E-05) (0.0416) (6.78 E-05) 
Private Label 0.00022** 0.00004** 0.00064** 0.00019** 0.00013** -9.4783** 
 (3.46 E-05) (6.92 E-06) (0.00052) (3.18 E-05) (1.55 E-05) (1.12) 
Noted: **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, standard error is reported in parenthesis. The brands of Dean Easy and Hood 
Lactaid are reduced lactose dairy milk, Deans and Deans Easy are owned by Dean Foods; Golden Guernsey, Golden Grnsy Mg and Morning 
Glory are owned by Foremost Farms USA.
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Table A.6: The Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities of Different Brands in 0.5 Gallon Containers 
 
Market: Green Bay in March 2007     
Brands 8th Continent Kemps Kemps Select Morning Glory Golden Guernsey Organic Valley Silk Light Deans Easy Deans Land O’ Lakes Dairy Ease Private Label Hood Lactaid 
8th Continent -5.7952** 0.00088** 0.00005** 0.00078** 0.00063** 0.00013** 0.00004** 0.00015** 0.00023** 0.00005** 0.00037** 0.00017** 
 (0.0701) (8.40 E-05) (9.84 E-08) (8.05 E-05) (9.94 E-05) (1.24 E-05) (2.14 E-06) (1.25 E-05) (2.05 E-05) (2.87 E-07) (2.38 E-05) (1.34 E-05) 
Kemps 0.00004** -2.7632** 0.00005** 0.00076** 0.00060** 0.00011** 0.00003** 0.00014** 0.00023** 0.00005** 0.00037** 0.00014** 
 (5.49 E-06) (0.2351) (1.10 E-07) (0.0001) (0.0002) (1.89 E-05) (3.48 E-06) (2.08 E-05) (3.63 E-05) (8.25 E-07) (4.03 E-05) (2.07 E-05) 
Kemps Select 0.00004** 0.00085** -3.0582** 0.00076** 0.00060** 0.00011** 0.00003** 0.00014** 0.00022** 0.00005** 0.00036** 0.00014** 
 (7.82 E-06) (0.0002) (0.2562) (0.0002) (0.0003) (2.75 E-05) (4.99 E-06) (3.04 E-05) (5.50 E-07) (5.50 E-07) (6.00 E-05) (3.01 E-05) 
Morning Glory 0.00004** 0.00086** 0.00005** -2.7261** 0.00060** 0.00011** 0.00003** 0.00013** 0.00023** 0.00005** 0.00036** 0.00014** 
 (4.42 E-06) (0.0002) (4.22 E-08) (0.0871) (0.0001) (1.53 E-05) (4.95 E-06) (1.66 E-05) (5.29 E-07) (4.40 E-07) (3.36 E-05) (1.67 E-05) 
Golden Guernsey 0.00004** 0.00085** 0.00005** 0.00076** -2.8057** 0.00010** 0.00003** 0.00013** 0.00022** 0.00005** 0.00036** 0.00014** 
 (7.75 E-06) (0.0002) (8.47 E-08) (0.0002) (0.2382) (2.72 E-05) (4.94 E-06) (3.01 E-05) (4.86 E-07) (4.86 E-07) (5.99 E-05) (2.97 E-05) 
Organic Valley 0.00006** 0.00093** 0.00005** 0.00080** 0.00064** -6.7703** 0.00004** 0.00016** 0.00024** 0.00006** 0.00039** 0.00019** 
 (5.18 E-06) (0.0001) (2.36 E-07) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.1325) (3.19 E-06) (1.84 E-05) (1.09 E-06) (1.09 E-07) (3.21 E-05) (2.05 E-05) 
Silk Light 0.00005** 0.00088** 0.00005** 0.00078** 0.00062** 0.00012** -5.3448** 0.00015** 0.00023** 0.00005** 0.00037** 0.00016** 
 (4.04 E-06) (0.0001) (1.40 E-07) (9.65 E-05) (0.0001) (1.45 E-05) (0.1602) (1.48 E-05) (2.45 E-05) (6.31 E-07) (2.85 E-05) (1.57 E-05) 
Deans Easy 0.00005** 0.00087** 0.00005** 0.00078** 0.00062** 0.00012** 0.00004** -5.2679** 0.00005** 0.00037** 0.00016** 0.00005** 
 (6.06 E-06) (0.0002) (1.44 E-07) (0.0001) (0.0002) (2.18 E-05) (3.79 E-06) (0.1187) (4.14 E-07) (4.24 E-07) (4.29 E-05) (2.36 E-05) 
Deans 0.00004** 0.00088** 0.00005** 0.00076** 0.00060** 0.00011** 0.00003** 0.00014** -2.8921** 0.00005** 0.00037** 0.00014** 
 (4.91 E-06) (0.0001)  (7.05 E-08) (0.0001) (0.0002) (1.70 E-05) (3.11 E-06) (1.85 E-05) (0.1290) (6.43 E-07) (3.63 E-05) (1.86 E-05) 
Land O’ Lakes Dairy Ease 0.00005** 0.00089** 0.00005** 0.00079** 0.00063** 0.00013** 0.00004** 0.00016** 0.00023** -6.2278** 0.00037** 0.00017** 
 (1.32 E-05) (0.0003) (5.05 E-07) (0.0003) (0.0005) (4.98 E-05) (8.35 E-06) (5.25 E-05) (6.43 E-07) (0.0000) (8.99 E-05) (5.37 E-05) 
Private Label 0.00004** 0.00088** 0.00005** 0.00076** 0.00060** 0.00011** 0.00003** 0.00014** 0.00023** 0.00005** -2.7616** 0.00014** 
 (3.15 E-06) (8.01 E-05) (4.28 E-08) (8.09 E-05) (9.89 E-05) (1.08 E-05) (1.99 E-06) (1.17 E-05) (2.06 E-05) (3.75 E-07) (0.0808) (1.18 E-05) 
Hood Lactaid 0.00005** 0.00091** 0.00005** 0.00079** 0.00064** 0.00014** 0.00004** 0.00016** 0.00024** 0.00006** 0.00038** -6.3098** 
 (4.96 E-06) (0.0001) (1.79 E-07) (0.0001) (0.0001) (1.81 E-05) (3.07 E-06) (1.78 E-05) (2.85 E-05) (9.42 E-07) (3.22 E-05) (0.0492) 
Note: **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, standard error is reported in parenthesis. The brands of Dean Easy, Land O’Lakes Dairy Ease and  Hood Lactaid are reduced lactose dairy milk, the brand Organic Valley is the organic milk, Deans and  Deans 




Table A.7: The Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities of Different Brands in 0.5 Gallon Containers 
Market: Milwaukee in March 2007        
Brands Organic 
Valley 























Organic Valley -5.1607** 9.22E-05** 1.85E-04** 2.72E-04** 0.00047** 9.14 E-05** 5.71 E-05** 0.00048** 4.11 E-05** 4.31 E-06** 1.22 E-04** 0.00043** 0.00073** 7.98 E-04** 0.00019** 
 (0.0491) (2.33 E-06) (9.08 E-06) (1.67 E-05) (1.67 E-05) (1.13 E-05) (2.81 E-06) (1.87 E-05) (1.54 E-06) (1.09 E-07) (3.33 E-06) (1.53 E-05) (2.72 E-05) (3.84 E-05) (6.62 E-06) 
Silk Light 2.32E-04** -5.0153** 8.25E-05** 2.14E-04** 0.00021** 3.65 E-05** 2.12 E-05** 0.00035** 2.69 E-05** 2.95 E-06** 5.38 E-05** 0.00030** 0.00029** 5.17 E-04** 7.51 E-05** 
 (7.47 E-06) (0.0350) (4.49 E-06) (1.56 E-05) (7.43 E-06) (4.83 E-06) (1.03 E-06) (1.79 E-05) (1.03 E-06)  (3.21 E-08) (1.56 E-06) (1.24 E-05) (1.17 E-05) (1,27 E-05) (1.86 E-06) 
Oberweis Dairy 2.44E-04** 4.21E-05** -4.7578** 2.20E-04** 0.00022** 3.79 E-05** 2.25 E-05** 0.00036** 2.72 E-05** 2.98 E-06** 5.55 E-05** 0.00031** 0.00030** 5.23 E-04** 7.96 E-05** 
 (4.26 E-06) (1.65 E-06) (0.0352) (2.43 E-05) (1.19 E-05) (7.87 E-06) (1.76 E-06) (2.75 E-05) (1.62 E-06) (5.06 E-08) (2.46 E-06) (1.91 E-05) (1.88 E-05) (4.50 E-05) (3.37 E-06) 
Deans 8.70E-05** 2.19E-05** 4.64E-05** -3.1191** 0.00012** 1.66 E-05** 8.68 E-06** 0.00030** 2.14 E-05** 2.41 E-06** 2.88 E-05** 0.00026** 0.00013** 4.08 E-04** 3.46 E-05** 
 (1.52 E-05) (7.59 E-07) (3.67 E-06) (0.1843) (6.04 E-06) (3.20 E-06) (6.54 E-07) (2.37 E-05) (1.13 E-06) (1.07 E-07) (1.20 E-06) (1.48 E-05) (7.79 E-05) (2.76 E-05) (1.75 E-06) 
Deans Easy 2.20E-04** 3.93E-05** 7.95E-05** 2.12E-04** -4.9741** 3.49 E-05** 2.02 E-05** 0.00034** 2.64 E-05** 2.91 E-06** 5.18 E-05** 0.00030** 0.00028** 5.08 E-04** 7.17 E-05** 
 (1.52 E-05) (2.13 E-06) (9.46 E-06) (3.43 E-05 (0.0696) (1.03 E-05) (2.06 E-06) (3.94 E-05) (2.22 E-06) (4.55 E-08) (3.25 E-06) (2.69 E-05) (2.42 E-05) (5.55 E-05) (2.53 E-06) 
Land O’ Lakes Dairy Ease 0.00033** 5.40E-05** 1.09E-04** 2.29E-04** 0.00028** -5.3734** 3.03 E-05** 0.00038** 3.06 E-05** 3.30 E-06** 7.12 E-05** 0.00034** 0.00040** 5.90 E-04** 0.00010** 
 (3.59 E-05) (4.69 E-06) (2.02 E-05) (5.80 E-05) (3.13 E-05) (4.44 E-05) (4.99 E-06) (6.57 E-05) (4.21 E-06) (0.00000) (7.01 E-06) (4.74 E-05) (5.48 E-05) (1.06 E-04) (5.53 E-08) 
Horizon Organic 0.00047** 7.09E-05** 1.43E-04** 2.51E-04** 0.00036** 6.85 E-05** -5.2232** 0.00043** 3.52 E-05** 3.75 E-06** 9.35 E-05** 0.00038** 0.00055** 6.82 E-04** 0.00014** 
 (3.63 E-05) (4.54 E-06) (1.86 E-05) (4.29 E-05) (3.13 E-05) (2.33 E-05) (0.1377) (4.78 E-05) (3.45 E-06) (1.37 E-07) (6.62 E-06) (3.68 E-05) (5.32 E-05) (8.72 E-05) (8.39 E-06) 
Kemps 9.98E-05** 2.38E-05** 5.06E-05** 1.99E-04** 0.00013** 1.86 E-05** 1.01 E-05** -3.3062** 2.19 E-05** 2.47 E-06** 3.13 E-05** 0.00026** 0.00015** 4.19 E-04** 3.93 E-05** 
 (4.83 E-06) (8.23 E-07) (5.28 E-06) (1.97 E-05) (6.57 E-06) (3.54 E-06) (8.17 E-07) (0.1590) (1.12 E-06) (3.96 E-08) (1.28 E-06) (1.44 E-05) (8.60 E-06) (2.75 E-05) (2.44 E-06) 
Kemps Select 9.14E-05** 2.26E-05** 4.67E-05** 1.93E-04** 0.00012** 1.73 E-05** 8.88 E-06** 0.00030** -3.5898** 2.44 E-06** 2.98 E-05** 0.00026** 0.00014** 4.13 E-04** 3.50 E-05** 
 (5.91E-06) (1.07 E-06) (5.19 E-06) (2.92 E-05) (8.26 E-06) (4.63 E-06) (7.83 E-07) (3.41 E-05) (0.1175) (1.90 E-08) (1.71 E-06) (2.14 E-05) (1.11 E-05) (3.97 E-05) (1.38 E-06) 
Kemps New Era 8.49E-05** 2.18E-05** 4.50E-05** 1.92E-04** 0.00012** 1.64 E-05** 8.29 E-06** 0.00030** 2.14 E-05** -3.4606** 2.87 E-05** 0.00025** 0.00013** 4.08 E-04** 3.31 E-05** 
 (1.35 E-05) (2.53 E-06) (1.30 E-05) (7.38 E-05) (2.12 E-05) (1.44 E-05) (1.94 E-06) (8.61 E-05) (4.24 E-06) (0.00000) (4.07 E-06) (5.30 E-05) (2.61 E-05) (1.10 E-04) (3.41 E-06) 
8th Continent 2.37E-04** 4.14E-05** 8.38E-05** 2.15E-04** 0.00022** 3.72 E-05** 2.17 E-05** 0.00035** 2.71E-05** 2.96 E-06** -5.0641** 0.00030** 0.00030** 5.20 E-04** 7.64 E-05** 
 (7.21 E-06) (9.98 E-07) (4.39 E-06) (1.54 E-05) (6.95 E-06) (4.70 E-06) (9.55 E-07) (1.76 E-05) (1.00 E-06) (1.42 E-08) (0.0156) (1.22 E-05) (1.14 E-05) (2.52 E-05) (8.45 E-07) 
Private Label 9.49E-05** 2.29E-05** 4.87E-05** 1.98E-04** 0.00012** 1.76 E-05** 9.44 E-06** 0.00031** 2.16 E-05** 2.44 E-06** 3.01 E-05** -3.1974** 0.00014** 4.14 E-04** 3.72 E-05** 
 (3.42 E-06) (5.90 E-07) (2.83 E-06) (1.51 E-05) (4.66 E-06) (2.50 E-06) (5.56 E-07) (1.74 E-05) (8.47 E-07) (2.40 E-08) (9.30 E-07) (0.0948) (6.11 E-06) (2.07 E-05) (1.58 E-06) 
Hood Lactaid 0.00037** 5.89E-05** 1.19E-04** 2.37 E-04** 0.00030** 5.57 E-05** 3.40 E-05** 0.00040** 3.19 E-05** 3.43 E-06** 6.26 E-05** 0.00035** -5.2039** 6.16 E-04** 0.00012** 
 (1.34 E-05) (1.72 E-06) (7.13 E-06) (1.87 E-05) (1.19 E-05) (8.29 E-06) (1.89 E-06) (2.11 E-05) (1.40 E-06) (5.16 E-08) (1.92 E-06)  (1.56 E-05) (0.0474) (3.54 E-05) (3.32 E-06) 
Golden Guernsey 8.16E-05** 2.13E-05** 4.41E-05** 1.91 E-04** 0.00011** 1.60 E-05** 8.00 E-06** 0.00030** 2.12 E-05** 2.40 E-06** 2.81E-05** 0.00025** 0.00013** -3.2638** 3.21 E-05** 
 (4.50 E-06) (8.32 E-07) (4.12 E-06) (2.36 E-05) (6.57 E-06) (3.50 E-06) (6.23 E-07) (2.76 E-05) (1.30 E-06) (2.64 E-08) (1.33 E-06) (1.72 E-05) (8.51 E-06) (0.1975) (1.54 E-06) 
Wisconsin Organics 0.00036** 5.74E-05** 1.17E-04** 2.37 E-04** 0.00030** 5.42 E-05** 3.31 E-05** 0.00040** 3.15 E-05** 3.39 E-06** 7.57 E-05** 0.00035** 0.00043** 6.08 E-04** -5.1078** 
 (4.04 E-05) (5.23 E-06) (2.20 E-05) (5.85 E-05) (3.78 E-05) (2.84 E-05) (6.11 E-06) (6.55 E-05) (4.42 E-06) (2.25 E-07) (7.70 E-06) (4.81 E-05) (6.07 E-05) (1.10 E-04) (0.1700) 
Note: **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, standard error is reported in parenthesis. The brands of Dean Easy, Land O’Lakes Dairy Ease and  Hood Lactaid are reduced lactose dairy milk, the brand Organic Valley, Horizon Organic and Wisconsin Organics are the organic milk, Deans and  Deans Easy, Land O’Lakes Dairy 
Ease and Horizon Organic are owned by Dean Foods; Golden Guernsey is owned by Foremost Farms. 
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Table A.8: The Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities of Different Brands in 1 Gallon Containers 
Market: Green Bay in March 2007     












Deans -6.39345** 0.01428** 0.02704** 0.03820** 0.03294** 0.00166** 0.00099** 0.01859** 
 (0.29030) (0.00863) (0.02006) (0.03157) (0.03161) (0.00082) (0.00095) (0.00043) 
Golden Guernsey 0.00765** -6.82660** 0.02933** 0.04170** 0.03529** 0.00194** 0.00112** 0.01939** 
 (0.00374) (0.27146) (0.02116) (0.03433) (0.03298) (0.00093) (0.00120) (0.00015) 
Morning Glory 0.00718** 0.01461** -6.48814** 0.03910** 0.03352** 0.00175** 0.00103** 0.01876** 
 (0.00358) (0.00855) (0.59748) (0.03176) (0.03184) (0.00088) (0.00102) (0.00098) 
Kemps 0.00746** 0.01514** 0.02859** -6.58687** 0.03442** 0.00184** 0.00105** 0.01891** 
 (0.00362) (0.00863) (0.02045) (0.84004) (0.03198) (0.00094) (0.00108) (0.00139) 
Private Label 0.00712** 0.01436** 0.02728** 0.03895** -6.16470** 0.00161** 0.00088** 0.01813** 
 (0.00339) (0.00773) (0.01928) (0.03077) (0.51360) (0.00078) (0.00080) (0.00088) 
Organic Valley 0.01004** 0.02238** 0.03903** 0.05318** 0.04543** -11.8522** 0.00670** 0.02465** 
 (0.00508) (0.01464) (0.02797) (0.04016) (0.04652) (0.87930) (0.00788) (0.00049) 
Wisconsin Organics 0.01004** 0.02251** 0.03911** 0.05313** 0.04548** 0.00860**   -12.0372** 0.02473** 
 (0.00526) (0.01610) (0.02868) (0.04149) (0.04740) (0.00661) (1.18720) (0.00054) 
Dairy lands best  0.00538** 0.01120** 0.02132** 0.02884** 0.02738** 0.00116** 0.00090** -5.74993** 
 (0.00365) (0.01216) (0.02001) (0.03065) (0.03166) (0.00071) (0.00120) (0.00000) 
Noted: **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, standard error is reported in parenthesis. The brands of Organic Valley and Wisconsin 
Organics are organic dairy milk, Deans is owned by Dean Foods; Golden Guernsey and Morning Glory are owned by Foremost Farms. 
 
Table A.9: The Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities of Different Brands in 1 Gallon Containers 
Market: Milwaukee in March 2007     










Deans  -6.7046** 0.0126** 0.0131** 0.0250** 0.0035** 0.0020** 0.0216** 
 (0.1643) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Golden Guernsey 0.0187** -7.8493** 0.0181** 0.0322** 0.0059** 0.0033** 0.0255** 
 (0.0018) (0.0660) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Kemps 0.0172** 0.0161** -7.2944** 0.0296** 0.0052** 0.0028** 0.0236** 
 (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.1798) (0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Private Label 0.0144** 0.0130** 0.0137** -6.3919** 0.0039** 0.0021** 0.0205** 
 (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0926) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
Organic Valley 0.0258) ** 0.0271** 0.0254** 0.0435** -12.0652** 0.0057** 0.0344** 
 (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0021) (0.1426) (0.0004) (0.0012) 
Wisconsin Organics 0.0255** 0.0266** 0.0251** 0.0430** 0.0100** -11.7027** 0.0339** 
 (0.0034) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0007) (0.1510) (0.0020) 
Borden Milk 0.0101** 0.0096** 0.0097** 0.0210** 0.0020** 0.0012** -6.6134** 
 (0.0032) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0052) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0000) 
Noted: **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, standard error is reported in parenthesis. The brands of Organic Valley and Wisconsin 





Table B1: The Coefficient Estimates of the Interactions of Organic Dummy with Time Periods 
Dummy Variables from Jan 2006 to Dec 2012 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
Organic dummy *Jan_2006 3.2431** 0.6295 
Organic dummy *Feb_2006 3.2360** 0.5178 
Organic dummy *Mar_2006 3.4204** 0.6304 
Organic dummy *Apr_2006 3.3702** 0.6258 
Organic dummy *May_2006 3.2925** 0.5463 
Organic dummy *Jun_2006 3.1909** 0.6111 
Organic dummy *Jul_2006 3.4782** 0.6021 
Organic dummy *Aug_2006 3.4908** 0.5919 
Organic dummy *Sep_2006 3.3830** 0.6031 
Organic dummy *Oct_2006 2.7897** 0.4604 
Organic dummy *Nov_2006 3.1008** 0.5545 
Organic dummy *Dec_2006 3.2483** 0.5533 
Organic dummy *Jan_2007 2.5250** 0.5446 
Organic dummy *Feb_2007 2.2508** 0.5269 
Organic dummy *Mar_2007 2.3894** 0.5040 
Organic dummy *Apr_2007 2.6048** 0.6568 
Organic dummy *May_2007 2.4256** 0.4633 
Organic dummy *Jun_2007 2.5812** 0.5179 
Organic dummy *Jul_2007 2.0173** 0.5462 
Organic dummy *Aug_2007 2.4794** 0.5304 
Organic dummy *Sep_2007 2.0256** 0.5945 
Organic dummy *Oct_2007 1.7563** 0.4703 
Organic dummy *Nov_2007 1.8608** 0.5005 
Organic dummy *Dec_2007 2.2975** 0.4982 
Organic dummy *Jan_2008 1.8182** 0.5199 
Organic dummy *Feb_2008 2.3686** 0.4253 
Organic dummy *Mar_2008 2.1724** 0.4377 
Organic dummy *Apr_2008 2.3264** 0.4985 
Organic dummy *May_2008 2.1459** 0.4753 
Organic dummy *Jun_2008 2.2953** 0.4851 
Organic dummy *Jul_2008 2.0224** 0.4940 
Organic dummy *Aug_2008 2.2807** 0.5590 
Organic dummy *Sep_2008 2.3058** 0.4328 
Organic dummy *Oct_2008 2.4356** 0.5077 
Organic dummy *Nov_2008 2.6149** 0.5170 
Organic dummy *Dec_2008 2.2510** 0.4468 
Organic dummy *Jan_2009 3.1783** 0.6024 
Organic dummy *Feb_2009 2.8075** 0.8336 
Organic dummy *Mar_2009 3.1066** 0.5850 
Organic dummy *Apr_2009 3.1889** 0.6577 
Organic dummy *May_2009 2.9632** 0.6241 
Organic dummy *Jun_2009 2.5777** 0.4446 
Organic dummy *Jul_2009 2.2844** 0.4431 
Organic dummy *Aug_2009 2.5176** 0.4721 
Organic dummy *Sep_2009 2.3197** 0.4665 
Organic dummy *Oct_2009 2.5775** 0.6115 
Organic dummy *Nov_2009 2.7070** 0.5460 
Organic dummy *Dec_2009 2.4132** 0.6443 
Notes: **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
96 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
Organic dummy *Jan_2010 2.6745** 0.6171 
Organic dummy *Feb_2010 2.4016** 0.7307 
Organic dummy *Mar_2010 2.5494** 0.4973 
Organic dummy *Apr_2010 2.0660** 0.4087 
Organic dummy *May_2010 2.4549** 0.4712 
Organic dummy *Jun_2010 2.1913** 0.5093 
Organic dummy *Jul_2010 2.1685** 0.4875 
Organic dummy *Aug_2010 2.0850** 0.4152 
Organic dummy *Sep_2010 1.9797** 0.4829 
Organic dummy *Oct_2010 2.4724** 0.6012 
Organic dummy *Nov_2010 2.1614** 0.5227 
Organic dummy *Dec_2010 1.9779** 0.5137 
Organic dummy *Jan_2011 1.4163** 0.4635 
Organic dummy *Feb_2011 1.5228** 0.6176 
Organic dummy *Mar_2011 1.7367** 0.4026 
Organic dummy *Apr_2011 2.0418** 0.4238 
Organic dummy *May_2011 2.1231** 0.4433 
Organic dummy *Jun_2011 2.2151** 0.5060 
Organic dummy *Jul_2011 2.3844** 0.5017 
Organic dummy *Aug_2011 2.1959** 0.5779 
Organic dummy *Sep_2011 2.2430** 0.5584 
Organic dummy *Oct_2011 2.2454** 0.4557 
Organic dummy *Nov_2011 2.2241** 0.5024 
Organic dummy *Dec_2011 2.3380** 0.4647 
Organic dummy *Jan_2012 3.8409** 0.5740 
Organic dummy *Feb_2012 3.6778** 0.6017 
Organic dummy *Mar_2012 3.8803** 0.6321 
Organic dummy *Apr_2012 3.5953** 0.5965 
Organic dummy *May_2012 3.3769** 0.8319 
Organic dummy *Jun_2012 3.7893** 0.5758 
Organic dummy *Jul_2012 3.1733** 0.5726 
Organic dummy *Aug_2012 2.9499** 0.5333 
Organic dummy *Sep_2012 2.9568** 0.5973 
Organic dummy *Oct_2012 2.8530** 0.5823 
Organic dummy *Nov_2012 2.8246** 0.5026 
Organic dummy *Dec_2012 2.7968** 0.4938 
Notes: **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
